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RACE AND REDISTRICTING: 
DRAWING CONSTITUTIONAL LINES 
AFfER SHAW V. RENO 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff* 
and Samuel Issacharojf ** 
In a democratic society, the purpose of voting is to allow the elec-
tors to select their governors. Once a decade, however, that process is 
inverted, and the governors and their political agents are permitted to 
select their electors. Through the process of redistricting, incumbent 
office holders and their political agents choose what configuration of 
voters best suits their political agenda. The decennial redistricting bat-
tles reveal the bloodsport of politics, shorn of the claims of ideology, 
social purpose, or broad policy goals. Redistricting is politics pure, 
fraught with the capacity for self-dealing and cynical manipulation. 
That different configurations of electors will yield different electo-
ral results is hardly new or noteworthy. The pejorative term gerry-
mander draws from the creative line drawing of Massachusetts 
Governor Elbridge Gerry in 1812,1 and from the founding strokes of 
the American republic.2 What is still relatively new is the attempt to 
constrain, under the aegis of the Constitution, the most wanton ex-
cesses of the process. It was only thirty years ago that the Supreme 
Court forced the rural legislators in Tennessee3 and Alabama4 to re-
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1974, Swarthmore College; J.D. 1977, 
Yale. -Ed. 
** Professor of Law and Preston Shirley Faculty Fellow, University of Texas School of Law. 
B.A. 1975, State University of New York; J.D. 1983, Yale. - Ed. The authors acknowledge 
the helpful comments of Jack Balkin, Cynthia Estlund, Lani Guinier, Pamela Karlan, Douglas 
Laycock, Sanford Levinson, and Richard Pildes. 
1. The term gerrymander was coined by Gilbert Stuart after reflecting upon the redistricting 
of Essex County, Massachusetts signed into law by Governor Elbridge Gerry. Stuart, a noted 
painter, opined that the bizarre districting configuration looked like a dragon. After a compan-
ion noted that it looked more like a salamander, Stuart fashioned the term gerrymander in trib-
ute to the district's political progenitor. See Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and 
Legislative Reapportionment, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 85, 85 (Chandler Davidson ed., 
1984). Perhaps as a consequence of these origins, the use of animal designations to describe 
convoluted districting patterns pejoratively remains in place to this day. 
2. One of the earliest examples was the attempt of Patrick Henry to gerrymander a congres-
sional district in Virginia to prevent the election to Congress of James Madison as a result of the 
latter's presumed opposition to the adoption of the Bill of Rights. Id. 
3. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (establishing thejusticiability of vote-dilution claims). 
4. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (adopting the equipopulational rule of one person, 
one vote for state legislative districting). 
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district their states to reflect the growth of the urban population cen-
ters, thereby undermining their stranglehold on state political power. 
The commands of the one-person-one-vote rule of redistricting are 
by now so ingrained as to obscure what else is new in the 1990s round 
of redistricting. For the first time since the great reapportionment de-
cisions of the Supreme Court in the 1960s, redistricting authorities 
have had to contend not only with equipopulational districting, but 
also with vigilant protections for minority representation. The passage 
of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act5 and the Supreme 
Court's expansive endorsement of the amended Act in the 1986 North 
Carolina redistricting case, Thornburg v. Gingles, 6 have placed the is-
sue of minority-controlled districts front and center in the decennial 
battle over representation. In state after state, the question of minority 
districts became the most visible and debated issue after the 1990 
Census, 7 oftentimes creating an uncomfortable alliance of minority in-
cumbents, aspirants for political office, and the Republican Party, the 
latter armed with the oversight powers of the Justice Department. 8 
Despite the centrality of minority representation to post-1990 re-
districting, the process took place in the absence of well-developed 
governing standards oflaw, particularly with regard to the application 
of the Voting Rights Act. The leading cases under section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act9 - the prohibition against the diminution of mi-
nority-voting influence - were forged in the battles against at-large or 
multimember electoral districts. These electoral systems permit all 
5. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, 1973aa 
(1988)). 
6. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
7. See Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right if He Had Said: "When 
It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1237 (1993). 
8. The 1990 round of redistricting was of particular concern to moderate Republicans with-
out ideological opposition to race-conscious politics. The prospect of concentrating - or "pack-
ing," as the practice is known in the redistricting trade - the traditional Democratic votes of 
racial and ethnic minorities into minority-dominated districts offered the possibility of eviscerat-
ing the biracial power bases of many liberal Democrats - thereby realizing the long-term strat-
egy of the late Lee Atwater, who early on saw in the redistricting battles of the 1990s the chance 
to undermine the bastions of Democratic control in state legislatures and in the House of Repre-
sentatives. See id. (describing political considerations in the 1990 round of redistricting); see also 
Henry A. Politz, The Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit, Order In Re: Complaint of Lewis H. 
Earl Against United States District Judge James R. Nowlin Under the Judicial Conduct and 
Disability Act of 1990 (May 15, 1992) (on file with the authors) (Judge Nowlin of the Western 
District of Texas breached judicial ethics in his ex parte contact with interested Republican par-
ties during the course of developing a court-ordered redistricting plan). See generally Pamela S. 
Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1705 (1993) 
(documenting cases of misuse of the Voting Rights Act for partisan gain). 
It should be disclosed that Professor Issacharoff was one of the counsel to the state of Texas 
in the redistricting litigation. 
9. 42 u.s.c. § 1973 (1988). 
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members of a community or electoral jurisdiction to vote separately on 
each candidate for office, thereby allowing a voting majority to control 
every seat in an election. For example, if a community is sixty percent 
white and forty percent black, and if the two racial groups have con-
sistently different voting preferences, the result of an at-large election 
for a city council in which black and white candidates vie for each of 
five council positions would be that the white candidate would likely 
prevail in each contest, with about sixty percent of the vote. In such 
cases, the perceived harm is the capacity of a majority community to 
capture a disproportionate share of representation through its ability 
to vote serially for each candidate for local office. The remedy of first 
recourse is to create electoral subdistricts in which minority electoral 
cohesion would bear fruit. 
Unfortunately, the post-1982 vote dilution caselaw gave little gui-
dance on how to arrange single-member electoral districts within dis-
tricted systems in which all jurisdictional lines were presumptively up 
for grabs. 10 Nor did the cases prior to 1990 articulate the conditions 
under which state redistricting entities were either permitted or re-
quired to resort to race-conscious practices. These issues were 
presented to the Supreme Court after the 1990 round of redistricting, 
in cases arising from the redistricting battles in Minnesota, Ohio, 
Florida, and, most notably, North Carolina - the setting for the 
landmark case of Shaw v. Reno. 11 Whereas prior cases had addressed 
the remedial use of race-conscious districting to alleviate proven exclu-
sion, the 1990s redistricting cases concerned the affirmative use of race 
in the quintessentially political process of dividing electoral spoils. 
North Carolina provided the Court with a combustible mix of 
race, politics, and undisguised self-dealing that was the perfect oppor-
tunity for considering these issues. The results of the 1990 Census 
entitled the state to an additional congressional seat, bringing its dele-
gation to twelve. Although its population is twenty percent black, and 
despite the growing political power of blacks, there had been no black 
congressional representation from North Carolina this century. Nev-
ertheless, the state initially apportioned itself in 1990 to create only 
one district likely to elect a black representative. The state presented 
10. Although there are scores of cases under the Voting Rights Act after 1982, there were 
only four appellate cases prior to the post-1990 redistricting that addressed the application of the 
Act to the districting configurations within single-member systems. Bernard Grofman & Lisa 
Handley, Identifying and Remedying Racial Gerrymandering, 8 J.L. & POL. 345, 348 (1992). 
The cases are Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990); White v. Daniel, 
909 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1990); Armour v. Ohio, 895 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1990); and Washington v. 
Tensas Parish Sch. Bd., 819 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1987). 
11. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
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the plan for approval to the Justice Department under the 
preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act. 12 The Justice 
Department objected to the state's refusal to create a second, heavily 
black district in the southeastern section of the state, which contained 
a significant concentration of black voters, and its decision instead to 
disperse black voters among a number of majority-white congressional 
districts. Following the Department's objection, the state went back 
to the drawing board with the avowed aim of increasing black 
representation.13 
The creation of a black congressional district in the southeastern 
portion of the state would have disrupted the power base of incumbent 
Democratic congressmen.14 Consequently, the legislature decided in-
stead to create the now notorious I-85 district in the north-central re-
gion of the state. This district stretched 160 miles in length, and often 
it was barely wider than the highway that it followed. Indeed, conti-
guity was maintained at one spot only because two parts of the district 
intersected at a single point. The plan satisfied the Justice Department 
objection by dividing towns, counties, and even precincts among as 
many as three congressional districts in order to capture sufficient 
numbers of black voters to create a second majority-black district. 
The plan earned the sobriquet "political pornography" from the Wall 
Street Journal 15 before being dubbed the "snake" district and struck 
down as "political apartheid" by a sharply divided Supreme Court. 16 
Shaw is no doubt a major opinion that attempts to define limits on 
the use of racial or ethnic classifications in electoral redistricting. The 
main thrust of this article is to assess the critical question of whether 
Shaw renders unconstitutional the type of race-conscious realignment 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). See generally Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 
563-71 (1969) {discussing the scope of the preclearance provision); South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) (describing the Voting Rights Act requirements as 
"shift[ing] the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims"). 
13. Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, a covered jurisdiction is required to obtain 
preclearance from the Department of Justice prior to the implementation of any change in voting 
practices. Since North Carolina did not receive preclearance, and since it failed to seek review in 
a declaratory judgment action before the District of Columbia District Court, its proposed redis-
tricting could not be put into effect. See Clark v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2096 (1991) (setting forth 
the prohibition of use of unprecleared electoral arrangements under § 5). In its objection Jetter to 
the state, the Department of Justice identified the failure to create a second majority-black con-
gressional district as the grounds for its failure to preclear. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 
2880 (1993). Accordingly, in order to obtain any future preclearance, the state was obligated to 
meet the terms of the objections set forth by the Department of Justice. 
14. See Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 479 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (Voorhees, C.J., dissenting in 
part), revd. sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
15. Political Pornography, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1991, at AlO. 
16. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2821 (referring to the district as "wind[ing] in snake-like fashion"), 
2827 (referring to "political apartheid"). 
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of electoral configurations that have given meaning to the voting-
rights reforms of the past two decades. 17 In making this assessment, 
we try to ascertain exactly how the Court has limited the use of race-
conscious districting, and we try to determine whether there is any 
jurisprudential coherence to the Court's latest confrontation with the 
law and politics of race. Our conclusion is that Shaw is as important 
for what it does not say as for what it does: its inconclusive resolution 
of the ultimate issue whether race may ever be justifiably relied upon 
in redistricting reaffirms the messy jurisprudence of compromise that 
has guided the center of the Court since Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke. 18 The heart of this jurisprudence is a never quite 
satisfactory accommodation between deeply individualistic notions of 
appropriate treatment and a politically charged conception of the rep-
resentational legitimacy of principal institutions in our society. 
I. THE FUTURE OF AN EVOLUTION: EQUAL PROTECTION AND 
VOTING RIGHTS 
A. The Context of the Past 
"Strict scrutiny" was the handmaiden of the law of the Second 
Reconstruction. Unwilling to invalidate every use of a racial classifi-
cation, 19 the Court announced that race-dependent government deci-
sions would demand extraordinary justification - a burden few such 
decisions were expected to, or could, meet. The strategy made emi-
nent sense in a world where virtually all racial lines since the demise of 
the First Reconstruction had been used to subordinate historically dis-
criminated-against groups. 20 By the 1970s, however, it was clear that 
state and federal policymakers were prepared to adopt race-conscious 
measures to ameliorate the exclusion of African Americans and others 
from important economic and educational opportunities. 
The ensuing debate in constitutional law on "affirmative action" 
centered, in large part, on the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. 
Those Justices and scholars inclined to uphold such measures stressed 
that the use of race was "benign" and therefore importantly different 
17. Since White v. Regester, 422 U.S. 935 (1975). 
18. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
19. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Interestingly, the term strict 
scrutiny was not used in Brown - perhaps because of Chief Justice Warren's intent to write an 
opinion using legal jargon accessible to the educated lay reader. See generally Michael Klarman, 
An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1991) (on the devel· 
opment of strict scrutiny analysis). 
20. But see Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourtee11th 
Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985) (detailing early race-conscious measures intended to 
benefit freed slaves). 
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from the immoral racial classifications of segregation. Accordingly, a 
lower level of justification for race-conscious measures aiding previ-
ously discriminated-against groups was appropriate.21 To others, the 
right not to be injured on the basis of one's skin color was a personal 
right secured by the Constitution, and the asserted lack of an invidious 
purpose could not be a sufficient reason for reducing the level of judi-
cial scrutiny applied to measures that disadvantaged persons on the 
basis of race. 22 
Justice Powell's opinion in the Bakke case split the difference. He 
held affirmative action plans in higher education to strict scrutiny,23 
yet he was willing to find that it was possible for the state to meet the 
burden of a compelling and close-fitting justification for the affirmative 
action plan.24 Powell's compromise- that race could be a factor but 
not the only factor in crafting university admissions policies - struck 
many as an ipse dixit in search of a theory.25 But his theory seems to 
have achieved widespread institutional incorporation, and employers 
and institutions of higher education have relied on it for the past fif-
teen years. 
Thus, the pre-Reagan Court had two doctrinal routes for approv-
ing race-conscious policies: applying a more deferential standard to 
"benign" measures, or applying strict scrutiny yet finding that rigor-
ous test to be met. 26 Bakke seemed to signal the latter route. But only 
a year earlier in the most important voting-rights case of this era, 
United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 27 the Court opted for the first 
approach. 
In UJO, a 1972 districting statute for New York State had in-
cluded a Hasidic Jewish community of some 30,000 people in a single-
assembly and single-senate district in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of 
21. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment); Paul Brest, Foreword: In De-
fense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. l, 16-22 (1976); Kent Greenawalt, 
Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preferences in Law School Admissions, 15 COL UM. L. REV. 
559 (1975); cf. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 150-65 (1980) (discussing the stig-
matizing effect as a differentiating factor). 
22. Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment 
of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 21-26; Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 
WASH. U. L.Q. 147; William Van Alstyne, Rights of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the 
Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1979). 
23. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978). 
24. 438 U.S. at 294-306. 
25. See Vincent Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 61 CAL. 
L. REV. 21 (1979). 
26. In Fullilove there was a little of both these routes, and perhaps a third route as well: 
relying on Congress's remedial § 5 power. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478 (1980). 
27. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
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Brooklyn. The Justice Department objected to the districting plan, 
asking the state to demonstrate that its plan had neither the effect nor 
intent of diluting minority voting strength. The state responded by 
submitting a new plan that divided the Hasidim between two assembly 
and two senate districts in order to create districts with substantial 
nonwhite majorities. Representatives of the Hasidic community filed 
suit, alleging that the new plan diluted the value of their vote by divid-
ing their community and assigning them to districts on the basis of 
their race. 
While there was no opinion for the Court, a majority of the 
Justices upheld the race-conscious districting of Brooklyn.28 The vari-
ous opinions identified two different grounds supporting the districting 
plan: characterization of the state conduct as benign, and a judgment 
that the Hasidim suffered no cognizable harm because their voting 
power had not been diluted in a constitutional sense. 
For a majority of the Justices, the redistricting plan was benign in 
two senses. First, the Court understood the Voting Rights Act to per-
mit a redistribution of political power to groups that Congress had 
concluded had been historically and unfairly excluded or under-
represented in the political process. Thus, the New York plan fur-
thered the permissible goal of "prevent[ing] racial minorities from 
being repeatedly out-voted" through the creation of districts that "will 
afford fair representation to the members of those racial groups who 
are sufficiently numerous and whose residential patterns afford the op-
portunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majority."29 
The state's purpose, therefore, contrasted markedly with earlier race-
conscious efforts that had intentionally disenfranchised protected 
groups. Indeed, under the Court's interpretation of the Act, the con-
scious decision of the state to provide for representation of previously 
underrepresented blacks was constitutionally permissible even without 
the predicate of a judicial finding of prior unlawful discrimination. 30 
The plan was benign in a second sense: it did not stigmatize members 
28. 430 U.S. at 145-46. 
29. 430 U.S. at 168 (opinion of White, J.). White also noted that the New York plan did not 
dilute white voting strength because it left whites, who constituted 65% of the population in the 
county, with 70% of the seats. 430 U.S. at 166; see also John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of 
Reverse Racial Discrimination. 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 735 (1974) ("When the group that con-
trols the decision making process classifies so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, 
the reasons for being unusually suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of 
review, are lacking."); Samuel Issacharolf, When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. 
Wilks and the Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
189, 247 (1992) (arguing that racial preferences are more likely to be benign when enacted by a 
majority that thereby burdens itself). 
30. 430 U.S. at 161. The Court's reasoning was buttressed by the fact that Kings County 
(which is Brooklyn) was a covered jurisdiction under§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 430 U.S. at 
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of the burdened (white) group, nor did it brand them with the impri-
matur of second-class status. As Justice White wrote, in a portion of 
an opinion joined by Justices Stevens and Rehnquist: 
There is no doubt that ... the State deliberately used race in a pur-
poseful manner. But its plan represented no racial slur or stigma with 
respect to whites or any other race .... 
It is true that New York deliberately increased the nonwhite majori-
ties in certain districts in order to enhance the opportunity for election of 
nonwhite representatives from those districts. Nevertheless, there was 
no fencing out of the white population from participation in the political 
processes of the county .... 31 
Similarly, in a brief concurring opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by 
Justice Powell, rejected the constitutional challenge on the ground 
that the facts of the case foreclosed "any finding that [New York] ac-
ted with the invidious purpose of discriminating against white 
voters."32 
Arguably, the impact of the districting plan on Hasidic voters was 
not benign; they were, after all, targeted on the basis of an ethnic 
classification to be the odd-folks-out in the redistricting shuffie. But 
the Justices viewed this harm as distinct from the injury imposed by 
districting plans that are based on the invidious purpose of shutting 
minority groups out of the electoral process. 33 
The second ground the Court found for upholding the state plan 
was that the plan did not unduly burden the Hasidim because they had 
suffered no deprivation of group rights. 34 The challenged districting 
plan did not have an adverse impact on white voters in Kings County 
or the state as a whole: under the plan, whites would still control 
roughly their proportionate share of legislative districts. Hence, the 
Court reasoned, "even if voting in the county occurred strictly accord-
ing to race, whites would not be underrepresented relative to their 
share of the population."35 
As should be apparent, the baseline assumption for this analysis 
was that the Hasidic community of Williamsburgh could take solace 
for its electoral exclusion from the fact that it was "virtually repre-
sented" by white legislators from other parts of Brooklyn or from 
148. That administrative designation lent both legitimacy and urgency to the state's aim of im-
proving the political prospects of black voters. 
31. 430 U.S. at 165 (opinion of White, J.). 
32. 430 U.S. at 180 (opinion of Stewart, J.). 
33. As best typified by the facts of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). UJO also 
resembles United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 205 (1979), in its acceptance ofa benign 
use of race to avoid potential civil rights litigation. 
34. 430 U.S. at 165-66 (opinion of White, J.). 
35. 430 U.S. at 166 (opinion of White, J.). 
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other parts of the state. The assumption that the Hasidim were inte-
gral elements of an undifferentiated white electorate is troubling to say 
the least; indeed, the Hasidim of Brooklyn appear to be a textbook 
example of a "discrete and insular minority" for whom special judicial 
solicitude is warranted, particularly when political rights are at 
stake.36 But the Court's focus on the noninvidiousness (indeed, posi-
tive good) behind the districting plan led it to indulge in a form of race 
"essentialism" - that is, the assumption that "white" voters share 
outlooks and interests simply on the basis of their race - that it would 
later attack in Shaw v. Reno. The political theory of "virtual represen-
tation" and an unstated sociological assumption about the nature of 
"whiteness" made the harm visited on the Brooklyn Hasidim un-
problematic in the eyes of the Court. 
As was true of Bakke, UJO revealed a deeply fragmented Court 
unable to issue a majority opinion.37 Yet the Justices achieved a rough 
compromise in cases evaluating "benign" racial or sex-based classifica-
tions over the next decade. Although there was no general agreement 
over the level of scrutiny to be applied, affirmative action measures 
would be upheld when the classification was aimed at remedying a 
palpable pattern of exclusion of historically disadvantaged groups,38 
and when the costs borne by the dispreferred were not exceedingly 
onerous. 39 The Court therefore would uphold the benevolent use of 
36. There is some evidence in the record in UJO that the Hasidim were being unfairly singled 
out for political division precisely for their particular status among the broad mass of white 
voters. The record shows that there were alternative districting arrangements that could have 
promoted the primary objective of providing black electoral opportunity, but that state authori-
ties had chosen to localize the costs of providing black opportunity on the uninfluential and 
underrepresented Hasidic community. See 430 U.S. at 174-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) 
(expressing concern for these charges raised by respondent-intervenors NAACP and others). 
37. Between the 1977 UJO decision and 1989, the Court only once mustered five votes for a 
single opinion in a case addressing racial or other group-based preferences. Even in that one 
case, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), Justice Brennan stitched together five 
votes by relying on a number of different rationales to support a preference program for black 
employees to enter into virtually all-white craft positions in a Gramercy, Louisiana aluminum 
factory. See, e.g., 443 U.S. at 200 (no state action in adoption of private affirmative action plan), 
208 (plan does not bar advancement of white employees), 202 (prima facie evidence of minority 
exclusion as a result of broader discrimination), 198-99 (overwhelming statistical evidence of 
minority exclusion by employer in question), 207 (no congressional intent to create a cause of 
action against minority preference programs). 
38. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 650-51 (1987) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in judgment); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 292 (1986) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in judgment); United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 210-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
39. The clearest example comes from Justice Powell's opinion in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of 
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986): "As part of this Nation's dedication to eradicating racial discrimina-
tion, innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy." 476 U.S. 
at 280-81. However, such costs must not be overly burdensome on those individuals or groups 
that are not preferred. Thus, for example, in the employment context, in which the bulk of the 
Court's jurisprudence on this issue was developed, Justice Powell writes, "While hiring goals 
impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the 
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classifications for approximately the same reasons articulated by the 
Court in the voting-rights context. Significantly, the Court also con-
sistently rejected the argument advanced first by Justice Rehnquist,40 
and subsequently by Justice Scalia,41 that the Equal Protection Clause 
and the various civil rights statutes require the rejection of all group-
based classifications, except in the most narrowly tailored remedial 
settings. 42 
By the time the Court revisited UJO in Shaw, however, equal pro-
tection law had evolved. A clear majority of the Court now firmly 
believes that race-conscious measures warrant strict scrutiny, whether 
or not such programs purport to remedy disadvantages suffered by 
historically discriminated-against groups.43 The Court has come to 
conceptualize the Equal Protection Clause as concerned with the use 
of classifications that injure individuals based on the presumptively ir-
relevant characteristic of race, not with the ameliorization of the prac-
tices and effects of historic racial subordination. 44 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 45 typifies this rendering of the 
Equal Protection Clause. In Croson, the Court held that Richmond's 
minority business set-aside program violated the Equal Protection 
Clause, applying strict scrutiny despite the plan's purported "benign" 
purpose. The Richmond plan had certain features that seemed to in-
vite the particular wrath of the Court. It extended its preferences to 
all minorities, regardless of whether they had been historically ex-
cluded from opportunity, or whether they were even present in the 
entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious 
disruption of their lives. That burden is too intrusive." 476 U.S. at 283 (footnote omitted). 
40. United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
41. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 664-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
42. In this regard, Justice Rehnquist's position in UJO is hard to explain. Justice Rehnquist 
joins the portion of Justice White's opinion that allows for the race-conscious districting in 
Brooklyn on the grounds that neither the Hasidic community in particular nor whites in general 
have suffered any dilution of their overall representation. See 430 U.S. at 165-68. This position 
is at odds with the exclusive use of racial classifications in narrow remedial settings that 
Rehnquist articulates in other opinions. 
43. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion of 
four Justices supporting strict scrutiny); 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring). This conception 
of equal protection applied to the primary addressees of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states. 
Federal race-consciousness programs might be judged by a lower standard. See Metro Broad-
casting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990). 
44. Thus this view is a rejection of the "group-disadvantaging principle" put forth by Owen 
M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 107 (1976). See also the 
anticaste reasoning found in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 16-22, 
at 1523 (2d ed. 1988), and in T. Alexander Aleinikoff,A Case/or Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1060, 1063-65 (1991). 
45. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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city ofRichmond.46 Second, the Richmond plan was not a response to 
the total exclusion of minorities but was arguably, in the Court's eyes, 
a product of racial self-dealing; at the time of the adoption of the mi-
nority set-aside, African Americans constituted a majority of the vot-
ing members of the Richmond City Council. 47 
In this context, it was not difficult for Justice O'Connor to reject 
the justifications of benignness and lack of an undue burden that had 
sustained earlier race-conscious programs. Echoing Justice Powell, 
she began by establishing that the level of scrutiny applied under the 
Equal Protection Clause would not vary based on the race of the pre-
ferred group: "To whatever racial group these citizens belong, their 
'personal rights' to be treated with equal dignity and respect are impli-
cated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of 
public decisionmaking. "48 
The "mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose"49 could 
not justify a lower level of scrutiny because it might simply mask "ille-
gitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics."50 To 
apply lower-level scrutiny to "benign" race-conscious programs would 
put the cart before the horse: strict scrutiny is needed to ensure that, 
in fact, the state has pursued permissible purposes. The Justices also 
expressed concern about the untoward consequences of so-called "be-
nign" classifications, concluding that such measures may well stigma-
tize the beneficiaries,51 as well as deepen racial divisions (by 
46. See 488 U.S. at 506 {discussing inclusion of Aleuts, Orientals, Indians, and Eskimos in 
the preferred group). 
47. 488 U.S. at 495-96 (noting that political power in Richmond, Virginia had shifted to a 
majority-black city council in striking down fixed minority set-asides for municipal contracts). 
The recognition that shifting political tides might affect equal protection claims has roots going 
back at least a century. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879): 
If in those states where the colored people constitute a majority of the entire population a 
law should be enacted excluding all white men from jury service, thus denying to them the 
privilege of participating equally with the blacks in the administration of justice, we appre-
hend that no one would be heard to claim that it would not be a denial to white men of the 
equal protection of the laws. 
100 U.S. at 308; see also Ely, supra note 29, at 735 ("When the group that controls the decision 
making process classifies so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for 
being unusually suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of review, are lack-
ing."); id. at 739 n.58 ("Of course it works both ways: a law that favors Blacks over Whites 
would be suspect if it were enacted by a predominantly Black legislature."). 
48. 488 U.S. at 493. 
49. 488 U.S. at 495 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 {1975)). 
50. 488 U.S. at 493. The Richmond program was apparently suspect, in part, because it was 
adopted by a city council on which blacks were a majority. See Aleinikolf, supra note 44, at 
1102-07. 
51. See 488 U.S. at 494 ("[P]referential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes 
holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a 
factor having no relation to individual worth." (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) {opinion of Powell, J.))). 
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distributing opportunities on grounds generally viewed - from an in-
dividualistic perspective - as impermissible).52 Finally, the Court 
recognized that a strict standard of review - even for "benign" poli-
cies - would make it more difficult for states to adopt programs based 
on racial classifications.53 Justice O'Connor criticized Justice Mar-
shall's "watered-down version of equal protection review" as "effec-
tively assur[ing] that race will always be relevant in American life, and 
that the 'ultimate goal' of 'eliminat[ing] entirely from governmental 
decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's race' will 
never be achieved."54 
While Croson elevates Justice Powell's approach to majority status 
(thereby suppressing the alternative approaches represented by UJO), 
Justice O'Connor's opinion is, in reality, a hardened version of 
Powell's analysis in Bakke. It is noteworthy that Croson is the first 
case to invalidate an affirmative action program in which the Court 
did not identify any individual who had been deprived of a vested in-
terest or expectation as a result of the plan. 55 Arguably the two opin-
ions are fully consistent because both strike down fixed quotas; Powell 
was willing to uphold only those affirmative action plans that, like the 
Harvard admissions program, used race as only one factor among 
many. But this reading misses the important atmospherics of tone 
that pervade the opinions. Croson does not read like Bakke. Gone is 
Powell's nuanced reading of race and society, his recognition of the 
need to find ways to permit institutions to include historically ex-
cluded groups while reaffirming the potential harm of race-based clas-
52. See 488 U.S. at 493 (unless strictly reserved for remedial settings, classifications based on 
race may "lead to a politics of racial hostility"). 
53. See 488 U.S. at 494-95 (describing the implications of adopting a relaxed standard of 
review for "benign" classifications). 
54. 488 U.S. at 495 (citation omitted) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 
267, 320 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
The idea that "benign" race-consciousness measures should be subject to relaxed review does 
not die altogether with Croson. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-66 
(1990) (However, a solid core of the Court is clearly hostile, as evidenced by Justice O'Connor's 
sharp dissent. 497 U.S. at 609-10 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Untethered to narrowly confined 
remedial notions, 'benign' carries with it no independent meaning, but reflects only acceptance of 
the current generation's conclusion that a politically acceptable burden, imposed on particular 
citizens on the basis of race, is reasonable.")). The lower federal courts have allowed benign 
classifications to survive scrutiny when undertaken by the federal government or undertaken 
pursuant to federal oversight. See, e.g., Milwaukee County Pavers Assn. v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 
419, 423-24 (7th Cir.) (federal government may authorize state to act beyond the confines of the 
Fourteenth Amendment), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991). 
55. This contrasts with the facts of Bakke, where the Davis Medical School failed to argue 
forcefully, despite its ability to do so, that Allan Bakke was denied admission for reasons other 
than the minority set-aside program. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276-78 
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); see also JOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE 
CASE 65-66 (1979). 
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sifications, and a balancing of the benefits to the preferred group 
against the harms imposed on the dispreferred. Powell sees an interest 
in cross-cultural learning and tolerance; O'Connor sees down-and-
dirty interest-group politics. Powell is searching for a way to mediate 
the necessary but inconsistent demands of a group-based remedy 
under an individualistically understood Fourteenth Amendment; 
O'Connor is seeking to stop the easy recourse to race in the crafting of 
state policies, a practice she believes will only exacerbate deep and 
dangerous societal divisions. Thus, Croson is Bakke with a twist. It 
represents a new model of equal protection that narrowly limits the 
use of race-conscious measures based on a norm of equal treatment of 
individuals rather than the raising up of disadvantaged groups - a 
model that is dedicated to the pursuit of social peace rather than social 
justice. 
B. Voting Rights and the New Equal Protection 
An individual-rights based view of equal protection is problematic 
when transferred to the voting context. Whereas most civil rights in 
this country are defined in terms of the state's treatment of individuals, 
voting rights are not demarcated so easily. An individual citizen can 
be guaranteed the right to go to the ballot box and cast a vote of 
roughly equal weight without needless encumbrances, such as a liter-
acy test or a poll tax or overly burdensome registration requirements. 
But, while these rights are necessary to a democratic order, they are 
hardly sufficient. At this level, there is little that distinguishes a demo-
cratic electoral system from a system that engages in show elections 
for predetermined outcomes, such as in the former Soviet Union. 
Nor can the problem of identifying individual voting rights be 
packaged as the right to vote for a winning candidate. In any con-
tested electoral system, this condition cannot be satisfied. Elections 
will not satisfy every voter's electoral preferences if they are to have 
any meaning. Indeed, if the right to vote for a winning candidate were 
a genuine condition for democratic rule, the former Soviet Union 
would have the upper hand because all voters in a one-party state are 
guaranteed the ability to vote for the winning candidate - and only 
the winning candidate. 
Therefore, once the conditions of equal weight and equal access to 
the ballot are satisfied, there is little in the way of individual rights that 
governs the electoral process.56 Attention must at this point shift to 
56. These issues are considered at length in Jonathan W. Still, Political Equality and Election 
Systems, 91 ETHICS 375 (1981). 
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group rights to differentiate a fair from an unfair system. 57 It is only 
as collective partisans of the same political preference - whether that 
preference is defined by party or race or any other measure - that 
voters can assert their right to meaningful participation in the political 
process. Moreover, once we recognize the collective quality of the 
civil right to vote, we must confront the compounding problem of 
identifying the groups that are entitled to claim this right. In the indi-
vidual context, the problem is relatively straightforward; the ballot is 
guaranteed to all citizens who meet rules of simple application, such as 
age and residency requirements. No such rule of simple application 
exists to determine which groups warrant representation. Neverthe-
less, at some point the state must determine who merits control of a 
district and who does not. 
The problem, however, does not simply stop at the point of identi-
fying which groups merit representation. Any cohesive group that is 
unanimous in a district will claim that it has been the victim of dis-
criminatory "packing"; they will claim they were forced to "waste" 
votes to win an election when a majority of just over fifty percent 
would have been sufficient. In a district of 1000 voters, for example, it 
would take 501 to control the electoral process. If all 1000 were par-
tisans of the same party, 499 votes that could have been used to sway 
the outcome in another district would have been wasted. Similarly, 
any group that loses an election with forty-nine percent of the vote will 
claim it has been forced to "waste" just as many votes as the group 
that wins an election with one hundred percent of the vote (here the 
claim is one of dilution). 
The demand for a right of political effectiveness on a nonpacked, 
nondiluted basis therefore requires the state electoral authorities to 
place some group or groups in a subordinate position. (YI e shall refer 
to such groups as "filler people.") As a result, the claim of a right of 
effective participation in an electoral system not only entails the recog-
nition of an affirmative group right, but - given the zero-sum quality 
of representation - the claim also assumes the right to subordinate 
electorally some other group or groups. 
Despite the implicit group-based nature of a voting-rights claim, in 
Shaw the Court attempted to bring voting-rights law into the new 
equal protection model by reconceptualizing the right at stake as per-
taining to individuals, not groups. Although the Court explicitly re-
jected what might appear the easiest route to this end - the 
57. As Sanford Levinson has argued, the only logical stopping point may be proportional 
representation. Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Propor-
tional Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 257 (1985). 
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recognition of a right to a color-blind electoral process58 - it fixed on 
another individually based understanding of the constitutional norm: 
the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a right not 
to be segregated on the basis of one's race in electoral districting plans. 
Shaw does not overturn earlier group-based decisions which focus on 
whether electoral schemes "dilute" the voting strength of protected 
minorities. However, Shaw makes clear that the fact of nondilution 
does not immunize districting plans from constitutional challenge.59 
Thus, Shaw distinguishes but does not overrule UJO, finding the indi-
vidual right defined by Shaw "analytically distinct"60 from the dilution 
claim rejected in UJO. 
Whether or not UJO has been declared dead, it is apparent that an 
individually minded understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment 
puts real pressure on UJO's grounds of decision. The willingness of 
the Court to see no constitutional injury to the Hasidic voters appears 
to ignore their individual interests in not being viewed simply as 
means to the end of creating a minority district. Moreover, in Shaw 
the Court appears to be uninterested in the claim that the districting 
plan furthers the "benign" purpose of increasing minority representa-
tion in the North Carolina congressional delegation (although we sug-
gest below why the Court might recognize such a justification for race-
conscious districting for less bizarrely shaped districts61). If, under the 
new equal protection regime, it is the use of race to classify persons 
that is offensive, the state's race-conscious districting may perhaps be 
justifiable, but it cannot be "benign." 
With Croson as the paradigm case for fin-de-siecle equal protection 
law, UJO stands on shaky ground, and the race-conscious districting 
generally thought permissible after UJO is subject to serious constitu-
tional challenge. Shaw v. Reno might have told us whether UJO, and 
voting-rights law in general, had been "Crosonized." Indeed, plaintiffs 
specifically argued in the district court that Croson and other recent 
race cases had fundamentally undermined UJO. 62 Nevertheless, the 
Court declined the opportunity to announce a clear and decisive norm 
58. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993). Compare Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke 
rejecting color blindness as a constitutional requirement in higher education admissions, yet con· 
ceptualizing equal protection rights in individualistic terms. 438 U.S. at 319-20. 
59. 113 S. Ct. at 2829-30. Thus much of the dissents' arguments about "no dilution" seems 
rather beside the point. See 113 S. Ct. at 2838-40 (White, J., dissenting). 
60. 113 S. Ct. at 2830. 
61. See infra section 11.C. 
62. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 471 (E.D.N.C. 1992), revd. s11b nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 
S. Ct. 2816 (1993). In their Supreme Court brief, plaintiffs argue that UJO "is a dangerous relic 
from the past and should now be formally interred." Appellants' Brief on the Merits at 40, Shaw 
v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357). 
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for districting cases or to reconsider UJO, choosing instead to focus on 
the peculiar shape of the challenged North Carolina district and to 
arrive at a decision whose broader implications for the review of state 
districting decisions is unclear. The result is an unhappy one for lower 
courts and litigators looking for guidance in this complex and charged 
area of law located at the core of American political life. 
II. SHAW V. RENO: AT THE CROSSROADS 
In this Part, we examine three different readings of the Court's 
opinion in Shaw. We label these (I) the "cueing" reading; (2) the 
"strict-scrutiny-all-the-way down" reading; and (3) the "excessive reli-
ance" reading. We hope that these rather infelicitous phrases become 
clearer in the pages that follow. 
A. The "Cueing" Reading 
Shaw might be read as merely "cueing" states to the need to com-
ply with the Equal Protection Clause when making districting deci-
sions. Philip Bobbitt, in an examination of the functions of judicial 
review, identified what he terms the "cueing function" of judicial deci-
sions. 63 Bobbitt suggests that in some constitutional cases the Court 
does not attempt to lay down legal doctrines for further development, 
but rather provides "a cue to a fellow constitutional actor" to take 
constitutional values more seriously.64 According to Bobbitt, "[i]t's 
not the threat of invalidating legislation per se so much as the argu-
ment for a different construction of the Constitution"65 that matters in 
these cases. National League of Cities v. Usery, 66 which overturned the 
extension of federal minimum wage and maximum hour legislation to 
state and local governments, is Bobbitt's prime example (he wrote 
before the case was overturned). The Court showed no interest in de-
veloping the National League of Cities doctrine; indeed, it distin-
guished the case in the next half-dozen related cases it decided. On 
Bobbitt's account, National League of Cities served as a shot across the 
bow - a warning to the political branches to think more carefully 
about the important constitutional values of federalism. 67 
It is possible that the Court intended Shaw v. Reno to serve this 
63. PHILIP BOBBIIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 191-95 
(1982). 
64. Id. at 194. 
65. Id. 
66. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528 (1985). 
67. BoBBIIT, supra note 63, at 194-95. 
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"cueing function." Unwilling to wade too deeply into the political 
swamp of electoral districting, the argument goes, the Court picked an 
extreme case in which to emphasize that at some point the use of race 
in districting decisions had gone too far. The Court may have little 
interest in further elaborating the theory, or in identifying a set of 
norms that would tell courts and litigators what constitutes a "bi-
zarre" shape for a district. It may also have little interest in providing 
guidance about what to do with a case involving race-conscious dis-
tricting that draws more "normal" shapes for districts. Under this 
interpretation, the Court's focus on the shape of the challenged North 
Carolina district - dramatically limiting the impact of its decision -
and its unwillingness to rule on the permissibility of race-conscious 
districting in general demonstrates that Shaw is not about doctrine, 
but about signaling the political branches. 
The possibility that Shaw is a "cueing" case is cause for consterna-
tion. Such decisions might be appropriate vehicles for interbranch 
communications in areas of law unlikely to spawn much litigation -
for example, federalism limits on congressional power. But reappor-
tionment cases demand a willingness on the part of the Court to de-
velop and supervise an extensive scheme for review of state districting 
decisions. Voting-rights cases are numerous, complex, and fact spe-
cific. Perhaps more centrally, these cases involve large numbers of in-
terested parties who can be expected to exploit any uncertainty in the 
law. Therefore, in the voting-rights context, vague norms, especially 
norms that may not be enforced at all, will produce costly litigation 
and serious uncertainty about important political events. 68 Surely the 
Court is aware of these troubling consequences, and it is unlikely the 
Court would issue a "cueing" opinion in this volatile area of the law. 
Accordingly, we assume that there is something else to the Shaw opin-
ion than a desire to cue but not to command. 69 
B. The ''Strict-Scrutiny-All-The-Way-Down" Reading 
On another reading, Shaw v. Reno is an ordinary application of 
68. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 
(1992), for a discussion of the costs of imprecision in areas of law likely to generate litigation. 
69. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57-69 (1992). Indeed, the Court already has en· 
gendered a great deal of irresolute litigation in the reapportionment context with its decision in 
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). In this case, the Court announced thejusticiability of 
partisan gerrymandering without identifying any applicable, concrete standards to guide the 
lower courts. See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest of Judicial Review of 
Political Fairness, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1643, 1671-72 (1993) (discussing fractious and indetermi· 
nate litigation uniler Davis). 
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prevailing equal protection norms.70 The usual rules that apply are as 
follows: 
(1) all race-dependent decisions are subject to strict scrutiny; 
(2) rule (1) applies (a) to policies that include an explicit racial classifica-
tion (Croson); (b) to policies that are neutral on their face but which are 
found to have been based on an intent to draw a racial classification 
(Washington v. Davis;71 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp. 72); and (c) to policies that, although neutral on their 
face, may be assumed to be race based because they defy explanation on 
any other ground. 
The structure of Justice O'Connor's opinion quite clearly follows 
this line of reasoning. O'Connor begins by declaring that the "central 
purpose" of the Equal Protection Clause "is to prevent the States from 
purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of 
race."73 She then notes that, when "the racial classification appears on 
the face of the statute," "[n]o inquiry into legislative purpose is neces-
sary"74 - that is, strict scrutiny automatically applies. 75 After re-
hearsing the justifications for strict scrutiny, O'Connor continues: 
"These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit 
racial distinctions, but also to those 'rare' statutes that, although race-
neutral, are, on their face, 'unexplainable on grounds other than 
race.' "76 
The plaintiffs in Shaw, of course, contended that the districting in 
North Carolina was one of those "rare" situations in which the policy 
could be explained only in racial terms, so strict scrutiny applied. The 
majority of the Court agreed. The "bizarre" shape of the North 
Carolina district allowed the Court to forgo the search for race-depen-
dent intent normally required in a case of a purportedly neutral 
classification. 77 
70. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); Palmore v. Sidoti, 
466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984). 
71. 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976). Note that Washington v. Davis is typically misread as re-
quiring a showing of "invidious intent"; in fact, it is the demonstration of a race-dependent 
decision - invidious or not - that triggers strict scrutiny. Any such decision based on invidious 
intent clearly would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but so might noninvidious race-based 
policies. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 469. 
72. 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). 
73. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239). 
74. 113 S. Ct. at 2824. 
75. 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493). 
76. 113 S. Ct. at 2825 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266). 
77. See 113 S. Ct. at 2825. Because the Court held only that the plaintiffs' claim was justicia-
ble under the strict scrutiny standard of review, it reached no final conclusion on whether the 
state's purported interest, including meeting the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, consti-
tuted a sufficiently compelling state interest to pass constitutional muster. 113 S. Ct. at 2832. 
Arguably, districting plans that create "black" and "white" districts should always "short 
circuit" the search for intent because, to the extent that intent is taken to mean purposeful ac-
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In this way, Shaw can be viewed as a replay of earlier electoral 
boundary cases. In these cases the Court was willing to presume the 
intentionality requirement of a constitutional claim from the visible 
effects of state conduct. The leading example is Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 78 in which the Court invalidated a Tuskegee, Alabama dis-
tricting plan that excluded black voters from the city limits by draw-
ing the city limits as "an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure."79 In 
Gomillion, as in Shaw, the Court applied strict scrutiny because the 
shape of the electoral district strongly suggested that the districting 
plan had relied upon an explicit racial classification. 80 Of course, 
under the "benign purposes" analysis applied in UJO, Gomillion and 
Shaw are quite different cases. The electoral boundary in Gomillion 
reflected an intent to fence black voters out of exercising political 
power in Tuskegee, while the district plan in Shaw reflected an intent 
to enhance minority representation in the North Carolina congres-
sional delegation. However, after Croson, this distinction matters not: 
" 'A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation,' " quotes 
O'Connor in Shaw, " 'is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only 
upon an extraordinary justification.' "81 
If Shaw is no more than a run-of-the-mill equal protection case, 
then it answers the question it purports to leave open. The Court in 
Shaw stated: 
It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment 
plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully 
could be challenged. Thus, we express no view as to whether "the inten-
tional creation of majority-minority districts, without more" always 
tions yielding a predictable result, there are few if any unintended consequences in the redistrict-
ing context. See 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (citing Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)). 
This is confirmed by the history of Justice Powell's efforts to apply the intent standard from 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), to electoral gerrymandering claims. See Karcher v. 
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 784 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting). The Court expressly rejected Powell's 
proposed intent standard in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 138-39 (1986). The Court is 
willing to stipulate the presence of intentionality in all governmental conduct in this arena and to 
search elsewhere for the definition of constitutional harm. The Court is unwilling to engage the 
same presumption of intentionality for the racial as opposed to partisan consequences in district-
ing. Justice O'Connor's opinion in Shaw seems to suggest that there is a difference between being 
aware of the demographic makeup of a district drawn to reflect political or geographic bounda-
ries and the intentional creation of such districts. 113 S. Ct. at 2826. 
78. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
79. 364 U.S. at 340. 
80. The Court reached a similar result in Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 458 U.S. 
457 (1982). In a challenge to a state referendum prohibiting the use of school busing, the Court 
allowed the busing issue to be so closely tied to racial integration as to turn the outcome of the 
referendum into a racial classification. Having identified the basis for using strict scrutiny, the 
Court had little difficulty in striking down the referendum results as not furthering a compelling 
state purpose. 
81. 113 S. Ct. at 2825 (quoting Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)). 
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gives rise to an equal protection claim. 82 
Under the reading of Shaw proposed here, the answer would have to 
be that strict scrutiny analysis would apply not just to "bizarre" dis-
tricts, but "all the way down." If a plaintiff could successfully show 
that a compact district had been drawn for racial purposes - for ex-
ample, the situation in UJO - the usual equal protection rules would 
apply: the plan would be declared unconstitutional unless the state 
could come forward with the extraordinary justifications called for by 
strict scrutiny. 
The potential implications of this reading of Shaw for everyday 
race-conscious districting should be apparent. As the Court has rec-
ognized on several occasions, including in Shaw itself, 83 the process of 
redistricting and reapportionment is highly political, and the partici-
pants in the process are exquisitely aware of the likely consequences of 
their decisions. When sophisticated political actors draw a precinct 
line to include one block but not another, create a district through the 
reshuffiing of precincts, or assign an additional legislative seat to one 
region rather than another, they act with the knowledge that someone 
stands to benefit from the decision and that someone stands to bear the 
cost. It is for this reason that the Court in Davis v. Bandemer, 84 the 
1986 Indiana case that established that partisan gerrymandering 
may violate the Constitution, refused to adopt an intent standard for 
distinguishing unconstitutional gerrymandering from routine line 
drawing.85 
There is no escaping the fact that at some level state actors making 
districting decisions always "intend" to rely on politics or race in mak-
ing their decisions. Redistricting is an area in which classifications of 
all kinds - most notably partisan, socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic 
- are the lifeblood of the process. No state actors in a politically 
charged redistricting fight could credibly claim that they did not take 
into account any demographic information concerning proposed redis-
tricting alignments. Given that racially polarized voting patterns are 
well documented, race and ethnicity will invariably be crucial demo-
graphic variables in redistricting decisions. Moreover, the open polit-
ical horsetrading involved in every redistricting battle leaves state 
actors vulnerable to the charge not only that they used racial classifi-
cations in drawing the lines, but more notably that they used such 
classifications expressly to reward one racial or ethnic group, based on 
82. 113 S. Ct. at 2828 (quoting 113 S. Ct. at 2839 (White, J., dissenting)). 
83. 113 S. Ct. at 2826. 
84. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
85. 478 U.S. at 138-41. 
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that group's race or ethnicity. A strict-scrutiny-all-the-way-down ap-
proach would strike a severe blow to the redistricting process precisely 
because it would be exceedingly difficult, given the prevalence of race 
as a factor in "ordinary" districting decisions, to articulate a coherent 
justification for any districting plan, let alone a plan that expressly 
relied on race as a contributing rationale. 
This is not to say that strict scrutiny would necessarily condemn 
all race-consciously drawn districts. The Court could apply strict 
scrutiny but still validate run-of-the-mill districting plans if it could 
identify a new, rather easily established, compelling state interest for 
the use of race in state districting decisions. For instance, state actors 
could cite the "diversity" interest articulated by Justice Powell in 
Bakke. 86 Such an approach could distinguish exclusionary from inclu-
sionary race-conscious districting in terms of the likely outcomes in 
legislative representation. This would shift the focus of inquiry to the 
necessity and the closeness of the fit between the state's permissible 
objectives and its choice of means. Under this view, the articulation of 
what could constitute a compelling state interest permits strict scru-
tiny to be something other than "strict in theory, fatal in fact." 87 We 
address this issue below. 88 
C. The Theory of "Excessive Reliance" 
The strict-scrutiny-all-the-way-down reading of Shaw is troubling 
not only because strict scrutiny threatens the invalidation of a large 
number of state districting decisions, but also because the Court in 
Shaw itself backed away from such a rigid analysis. If Shaw is a run-
of-the-mill equal protection case, why would the Court pay so much 
attention to the "bizarre" shape of the North Carolina district, and 
why did the Court render the equivocal holding that plaintiffs had 
stated a cause of action, rather than simply striking down the district-
ing plan? As the lower court's opinion records, the state "formally 
concede[d] that the state legislature deliberately created the [district] 
in a way to assure black-voter majorities."89 That is, there can be no 
doubt that, on the record before the Court, the decision to create the 
challenged district was race dependent. If the Court were truly com-
86. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-14 (1977). 
87. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 518-19 (1980). The expression originates in Gerald 
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of E1·0/ving Doctrine 011 a 
Changing Court: A Mode/for the Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I, 8 (1972). 
88. See infra text accompanying notes 223-43. 
89. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 470 (E.D.N.C. 1992), revd. sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 
S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
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mitted to strict-scrutiny-all-the-way-down, it needed only to note the 
presence of a race-based classification and apply strict scrutiny. The 
shape of the district might be relevant to the state's defense of its ac-
tions, but it should - under run-of-the-mill equal protection theory 
- be irrelevant to the discussion of whether or not the plaintiffs had 
stated a cause of action. 
This is not, however, how the Court's opinion reads. The shape of 
the district seems quite clearly to lie at the core of the Court's judg-
ment. The Court characterized the plaintiffs' central claim as follows: 
"What appellants object to is redistricting legislation that is so ex-
tremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an 
effort to segregate the races for purpose of voting, without regard to 
traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling 
justification."90 One might understand this language as simply al-
lowing the Court to conclude that an arguably neutral classification 
was in fact race based under the strict-scrutiny-all-the-way-down the-
ory, but perhaps it is signaling something else. Perhaps there is some-
thing that categorically distinguishes an "excessive" use of race91 in 
districting decisions from the use of race as one element among many. 
The idea that race may be a factor but not the only factor traces to 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. 92 It is also consistent with Justice 
O'Connor's repeated characterization in Croson of the challenged set-
aside program as an "an unyielding racial quota," "a rigid rule erect-
ing race as the sole criterion."93 To many, however, the one factor 
versus rigid quota distinction has no satisfactory theoretical underpin-
90. 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (emphasis added). This emphasis on irregular shape appears through-
out the opinion. For example, the Court states: "UJO's framework simply does not apply 
where, as here, a reapportionment plan is alleged to be so irrational on its/ace that it immediately 
offends principles of racial equality." 113 S. Ct. at 2829 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the 
Court states: 
Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause 
by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme 
so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into 
separate voting districts because of their race .... 
113 S. Ct. at 2832 (emphasis added). 
91. Despite intimations in the Court's opinion to the contrary, race was not the only consid-
eration in the drawing of the challenged district. Geography played some role, as did a desire to 
protect incumbents elsewhere in the State. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expres-
sive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election District Appearances Af-
ter Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 489-91, 516-26 (1993). 
92. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-19 (1978) (opinion of Powell, 
J.). 
93. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499, 493 (1989); see also 488 U.S. at 
493 ("The Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed percent-
age of public contracts based solely upon their race.") (emphasis added), 499 ("rigid racial 
quota"), 505 ("rigid racial preferences"). For an examination of the linguistic devices used in 
Croson and other cases, see generally PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND 
RIGHTS 103-06 (1991). 
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ning. As bas been frequently noted, to use race as a factor in any case 
between two otherwise equally qualified aspirants for a job or place in 
a university is, in effect, the use of race as the sole criterion, at least at 
the final margin.94 Yet the distinction resonates with public intuitions 
and convictions; it is probably the case that the Harvard affirmative 
action plan - in which race functioned as a "plus factor" - is, as 
Justice Brennan suggests in his Bakke opinion, "more acceptable to 
the public" than the quota system adopted by the Davis medical 
school.95 But why should this be? If it is the simple use of race that 
triggers strict scrutiny under current equal protection doctrine, should 
constitutional law distinguish between the Harvard and Davis affirma-
tive action plans? An "excessive reliance" reading of Shaw v. Reno 
suggests that there ought to be a difference. The challenge, however, is 
to develop a plausible theory to account for the difference. 
Such a theory might begin with the Court's telling comment in 
Shaw that "we believe that reapportionment is one area in which ap-
pearances do matter."96 That is, a bizarrely shaped district bespeaks a 
willful manipulation of the districting system to force an electoral out-
come upon a disinclined electorate. When the gerrymander has a visi-
ble racial component, the Court implicitly reasons, the districting 
decision flashes the message: "RACE, RACE, RACE." A "natu-
ral"97 compact district sends no such message, even if it bas been de-
94. See Justice Brennan's opinion in Bakke: 
There is no sensible, and certainly no constitutional, distinction between, for example, 
adding a set number of points to the admissions rating of disadvantaged minority applicants 
as an expression of the preference with the expectation that this will result in the admission 
of an approximately determined number of qualified minority applicants and setting a fixed 
number of places for such applicants as was done here. 
438 U.S. at 378. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223-39 (1978); 
Blasi, supra note 25. Justice White's dissent in Shaw makes the point this way: 
The consideration of race in "segregation" cases is no different than in other race-conscious 
districting; from the standpoint of the affected groups, moreover, the line-drawings all act in 
similar fashion .... 
. . . Given two districts drawn on similar, race-based grounds, the one does not become 
more injurious than the other simply by virtue of being snake-like, at least so far as the 
Constitution is concerned and absent any evidence of differential racial impact. 
113 S. Ct. at 2840-41 (White, J., dissenting). 
95. 438 U.S. at 379. 
96. 113 S. Ct. at 2827. "Appearance" is a recurring concern in the Court's opinions these 
days. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803-04 (1992) (reHecting con· 
cern about "institutional integrity" and stare decisis); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 
2353-54 (1992) (concerning the appearance of excluding blacks from juries and the legitimacy of 
criminal justice system); see also William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It'~· The 
Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986) (arguing that the Court's 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is the product of judicial concern with appearances). 
97. The line between gerrymanders and permissible permutations among districts is ex-
tremely elusive. While some commentators have defined gerrymanders by their "arbitrary" or 
"unnatural" manner, see, e.g., Leroy Hardy, Considering the Gerrymander, 4 PEPP. L. REV. 245, 
247 (1977), others reject the idea of verifiable "natural" districts. See MARK E. RUSH, DOES 
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fined to create a majority-minority district. Why might the symbolic 
aspect of appearance matter so much? The Court offers several 
reasons: 
[1] A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals 
who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by 
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in com-
mon with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable 
resemblance to political apartheid. 
[2] It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group 
- regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community 
in which they live - think alike, share the same political interests, and 
will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such per-
ceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes .... 
[3] By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate 
the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting 
is sometimes said to counteract. 
[4] The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is 
equally pernicious. When a district obviously is created solely to effectu-
ate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials 
are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent 
only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a 
whole. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative 
democracy. 98 
As an initial matter, it is worth noting the extravagance of some of 
these claims. Labeling the North Carolina districting as "political 
apartheid" is a disturbing exaggeration that hinders the Court's analy-
sis in several ways.99 First, the pejorative characterization equates the 
attempt to ensure representation of underrepresented minority groups 
with attempts to deny racially dominated groups a role in democratic 
governance. More importantly, it paints a false picture of the actual 
districts drawn by North Carolina. Given the strong images evoked 
by the Court's language, one might expect districts that are over-
whelmingly white or African American, as we have come to expect 
with "segregated" schools. In fact, half of the voting districts estab-
lished under the challenged plan came close to the racial makeup of 
the state's population, which was about seventy-six percent white and 
twenty-one percent African American. 100 In the two majority-minor-
ity districts, African Americans constituted fifty-seven and fifty-six 
percent of the overall population and slightly lower percentages of the 
DISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 3 (1993). See generally Pildes & Niemi, supra note 91, at 
537-39 (describing the various types of districting arguments). 
98. 113 S. Ct. at 2827 (citations omitted; numbering added). 
99. See 113 S. Ct. at 2840 (White, J., dissenting) (noting "the emotions stirred by words such 
as 'segregation' and 'political apartheid' "). 
100. The populations of North Carolina's districts are as follows: 
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voting-age population. In other districts, the minority population fell 
below ten percent, the predictable outcome of creating districts in 
which African Americans are a majority. If these data described resi-
dential communities, we would consider them remarkably integrated 
by usual American standards.101 Thus, while some of the districts 
were undoubtedly drawn in order to guarantee that African Ameri-
cans would constitute a majority, it is difficult to justify the hyperbolic 
labels the Court applied. 
We are also troubled by the casual empirical assumptions of the 
Court's analysis. What is the evidence that race-conscious districting 
exacerbates racial bloc voting, or that it sends a message to an elected 
representative that she need only represent members of her group?102 
There is only rudimentary evidence of the relative quality of represen-
tation and responsiveness in racially drawn districts, 103 none of which 
is referred to by the Court, and none of which supports the categorical 
assertion that representation from such districts is fundamentally dif-
ferent from that afforded other constituent groups who form a major-
ity in a congressional district. The Court's description of democratic 
legitimacy also seems rather thin. It is certainly arguable that demo-
cratic processes are enhanced rather than degraded when previously 
District % White % African American 
1 41.61 57.26 
2 76.23 21.94 
3 76.65 21.48 
4 77.19 20.13 
5 83.85 15.17 
6 91.32 7.48 
7 71.48 7.27 
8 72.85 23.25 
9 89.14 8.93 
10 93.69 5.46 
11 90.89 7.20 
12 41.80 56.63 
State Appellees' Brief at 2la-24a, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357). 
101. See DOUGLAS s. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID (1993) on 
the extent of residential segregation. 
102. It seems at least as plausible that a black representative who responds only to the needs 
of a black constituency in a district in which blacks constitute a majority of the voters might be 
challenged successfully by a black candidate who is able to put together a cross-racial coalition. 
A good example may be found in the defeat of Gus Savage by Mel Reynolds in a south side of 
Chicago congressional district. See Robert Davis, More History for Congress, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 
1992, (Chicagoland), at 1 (reporting significant white support for Reynolds as a result of Savage's 
alleged antisemitism). 
103. CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS 74-98 (1993); see also Rodolfo 0. 
de la Garza & Louis DeSipio, Save the Baby, Change the Bathwater, and Scrub the T11b: Latino 
Electoral Participation After Seventeen Years of Voting Rights Act Coverage, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 
1479 (1993) (discussing the history of the Voting Rights Act in relation to Latinos). B11t see 
Randall L. Kennedy, Blacks in Congress: Carol Swain's Critique, in 2 RECONSTRUCTION, vol. 2, 
at 34 (1993) (criticizing the paucity of support for Swain's thesis). 
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excluded groups are able to elect representatives of their choice, even if 
those representatives primarily seek to further the interests of that 
constituency. 104 Indeed, claiming that representatives should look pri-
marily to interests beyond their district calls into question the entire 
edifice of geographically based districting. 
If the Court's comments about apartheid and democratic theory 
seem overstated and undersubstantiated, there is another version of 
the "appearance" claim that might support a distinction between us-
ing race to create "bizarrely shaped" districts and using race as a fac-
tor in the drawing of more "normally" shaped districts. Underlying 
the Court's insistence on strict scrutiny for racial classifications is the 
belief that such lines are inherently divisive, calling attention to differ-
ences that have poisoned American society in the past and that 
threaten to poison American society in the future. In Croson, Justice 
O'Connor spoke of "[t]he dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a 
society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity."105 The prob-
lem in both Croson and Shaw is the ease with which decisionmakers 
resort to race in creating important public policies.106 For O'Connor, 
and a majority of the Court in Shaw and Croson, protection against "a 
politics of racial hostility" demands that classifications based on race 
be "strictly reserved for remedial settings."107 In Shaw, O'Connor 
also quotes the powerful objection to race-based districting articulated 
by Justice Douglas in his dissent in Wright v. Rockefeller: 108 
When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, 
multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together 
as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion 
rather than to political issues are generated; communities seek not the 
best representative but the best racial or religious partisan. 109 
The danger of "balkanization" is more than a metaphor in the world 
of electoral district line drawing. 110 
It is here that one may begin to make some sense of the Court's 
104. See 113 S. Ct. at 2849 n.9 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("As for representative democracy, I 
have difficulty seeing how it is threatened (indeed why it is not, rather, enhanced) by districts 
that are not even alleged to dilute anyone's vote."). 
105. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989). 
106. Cf Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 
1807 (1989) ("I simply do not want race-conscious decisionmaking to be naturalized into our 
general pattern of academic evaluation. I do not want race-conscious decisionmaking to lose its 
status as a deviant mode of judging people or the work they produce."). 
107. 488 U.S. at 493, cited in Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831. 
108. 376 U.S. 52 (1964). 
109. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827 (quoting Wright, 376 U.S. at 67). 
110. See Clint Bolick, Clinton's Quota Queens, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1993, at Al2. But see 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Richard H. Pildes, In Defense of Lani Guinier, WALL ST. J., May 13, 
1993, at Al5; Randall L. Kennedy, Lani Guinier's Constitution, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1993, at 36. 
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claim that reapportionment is one area in which "appearances do mat-
ter."111 Peculiarly shaped districts that can only be described on the 
basis of race underscore the deep racial divisions that American soci-
ety has yet to overcome. They tell us the unfortunate news that differ-
ent races need and want representatives of "their own kind." Thus the 
Court repeatedly mentions the "message" and "signal" that such dis-
tricts send. 112 Race-as-a-factor districts of a more compact nature are 
less likely to send these messages. Rather, they are likely to be viewed 
as primarily dependent on neutral, nonracial facts, such as geographi-
cal and political boundaries. To be sure, a racial group may be dispro-
portionately present in compact districts, but this can be seen as the 
result of residential housing patterns, 113 not an intent to draw a line in 
order to reaffirm racial differences. Thus, few Americans are likely to 
be surprised that congressional districts in Harlem or Chicago's south 
side have largely minority constituencies. However, if a district were 
created in Iowa by linking together African-American communities in 
Iowa's major cities, the "racial message" would be clear, and, from the 
Court's perspective, it would be a message that only heightens racial 
division in the nation. 
The Court's theory is ultimately that classifications that can only 
be explained on the basis of race are just as divisive as those explicitly 
based on race, and concerns about such divisiveness link Shaw with 
the opinions that form the majority in Croson. 114 But there is another, 
perhaps more important strand in the Court's Shaw opinion that 
111. 113 S. Ct. at 2827. 
112. E.g., 113 S. Ct. at 2827 ("The message that such districting sends to elected representa· 
tives is equally pernicious."), 2828 ("[Race-conscious districting] reinforces racial stereotypes 
.... "). 
113. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 101. 
114. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (opinion of 
O'Connor, J.) ("Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are 
strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and 
lead to a politics of racial hostility."); 488 U.S. at 520 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (charac· 
terizing set-aside program as "a preference which will cause the same corrosive animosities that 
the Constitution forbids in the whole sphere of government and that our national policy con· 
demns in the rest of society as well"); 
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as nothing compared with 
the difficulty of eradicating from our society the source of those effects, which is the ten· 
dency - fatal to a Nation such as ours - to classify and judge men and women on the basis 
of their country of origin or the color of their skin. 
488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); 
[T]hose who believe that racial preferences can help to 'even the score' display, and rein-
force, a manner of thinking by race that was the source of the injustice and that will, if it 
endures in our society, be the source of more injustice still .... Racial preferences appear to 
'even the score' (in some small degree) only if one embraces the proposition that our society 
is appropriately viewed as divided into races .... 
488 U.S. at 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
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traces to the dissenting opinions in Metro Broadcasting. 115 The claim 
- which we term the antiessentialism factor - is that attribution of 
political or cultural views to persons based simply on their race denies 
persons recognition and treatment based upon their individual charac-
teristics. According to the Court in Shaw, racial gerrymandering "re-
inforces the perception that members of the same racial group -
regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community 
in which they live - think alike, share the same political interests, and 
will prefer the same candidates at the polls."116 To fashion public pro-
grams on the belief that all African Americans or Latinos or women 
have identical preferences and outlooks is to make a factual and moral 
error; it is to deny a basic, individualistic premise of the American 
creed.117 The injury runs not only to the "stereotyped" voters, but 
also to the democratic process: representatives elected from such dis-
tricts "are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to 
represent only the members of that group, rather than their constitu-
ency as a whole." 118 On this account, "bizarre" voting districts tell an 
"essentializing" story. The official line drawers roam around the state 
identifying members of protected groups in an effort to gather up 
enough voters of the appropriate race to form an electoral majority. 
Race-as-a-factor districting strategies may be thought to be less es-
sentializing. In attempting to create compact districts, state officials 
start with geographical and political considerations. Race may play a 
role at the margin. Indeed, race may well be linked to geography, 
political affiliation, and the existence of "communities of interest," ele-
ments that are traditionally consulted to aid in districting decisions. 
But when race is only one element, it may be escaped: citizens may 
vote with their feet, choosing a district in a different area. When race 
is the sole factor, however, exit may not be so easy. As the challenged 
North Carolina district shows, African-American voters may be 
115. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
("Social scientists may debate how peoples' thoughts and behavior reflect their background, but 
the Constitution provides that the Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among 
individuals based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act or think."); 
497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Although the majority disclaims it, the FCC policy 
seems based on the demeaning notion that members of the defined racial groups ascribe to certain 
'minority views' that must be different from those of other citizens."). 
116. 113 S. Ct. at 2827. 
117. Unfortunately, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the assumption of racial 
cohesiveness is not an artifact of the state's political imagination but reflects a persistent and 
troubling reality of American life. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political 
Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1854-56 
(1992) (describing prevalence of racial voting practices). 
118. 113 S. Ct. at 2827. 
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tracked down no matter where they live in the state; race, not place of 
residence, is destiny. 
The most rigid forms of antiessentialism collapse into the view, 
which dates at least to Justice Harlan's dissent in P/essy v. Ferguson, 119 
that the Constitution is "color-blind," and that any consideration of 
race is invidious. Justice O'Connor's antiessentialism claim is more 
limited and ultimately rests on an understanding of proper representa-
tion as geopolitical. "A reapportionment statute," reports Justice 
O'Connor, "typically does not classify persons at all; it classifies tracts 
of land, or addresses."120 At times, geopolitical districting may pro-
duce districts of predominantly one race. 121 Indeed, in our world of 
dramatic residential segregation, the existence of compact "black" dis-
tricts may tend to reinforce the view that "neutral" - that is, nonra-
cial - factors were used. It is only the "bizarre" district that so 
starkly points to the ascriptive use of race. 
Of course, the "common knowledge" that districts largely track 
geographical and political boundaries is frequently quite wrong. For 
example, the Court's quoted witticism about the North Carolina dis-
trict - " '[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, 
you'd kill most of the people in the district' " 122 - was coined in 
Texas in the 1970s,123 not in North Carolina in 1993. The quip was 
used not to describe a district drawn to ensure election of an African-
American representative - no African-American member of Con-
gress from Texas had yet been elected in this century - but rather to 
lampoon an oddly configured district created to protect incumbents in 
adjacent districts after the 1970 census. Moreover, even the founda-
tion blocks of the Union, the states, reveal odd configurations which 
would violate the "traditional" districting patterns. The odd shapes of 
Maryland and West Virginia, and the peculiar inclusion of the Upper 
Peninsula in Michigan are notable examples. 
Nonetheless, the fact that deviations from geopolitical compact-
119. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
120. 113 S. Ct. at 2826. This view is strikingly at odds with Chief Justice Warren's admoni-
tion that "[l]egislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not 
farms or cities or economic interests." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). 
121. See 113 S. Ct. at 2826: 
[W]hen members of a racial group live together in one community, a reapportionment plan 
that concentrates members of the group in one district and excludes them from others may 
reflect wholly legitimate purposes. The district lines may be drawn, for example, to provide 
for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to maintain the integrity of political 
subdivisions. 
122. 113 S. Ct. at 2820 (quoting Joan Biskupic, N.C. Case To Pose Test of Racial Redistrict-
ing, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4 (quoting State Rep. Mickey Michaux)). 
123. See Adam Clymer, Congressional Districts, Custom Made, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1991, 
§ 4, at 4. 
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ness are common has not seemed to alter the Court's intuitions about 
what an electoral district "ought to look like." It is this sense of what 
constitutes a "proper" district that adds a final element to the distinc-
tion between "excessive reliance" and "race-as-a-factor" districting. 
"Naturally" drawn reapportionment plans may well yield majority-
minority districts, if minority communities are large and dense 
enough, but a "bizarre" district crafted solely to yield a black repre-
sentative is seen as unfairly enhancing black voting power. The claim 
here parallels the frequent charge that affirmative action plans unfairly 
manipulate a "neutral" set of standards to provide _advantages to racial 
minorities. From this perspective, it is no answer to say that, overall, 
whites control a proportionate share of the electoral districts. 124 
When the baseline is "neutral" districting, the measure of dilution 
from the geopolitical perspective is not proportionality, but rather 
what a compact reapportionment plan would yield. If blacks are not 
residentially concentrated in such a way as to guarantee majority sta-
tus in a district, so be it. 125 When members of one political party are 
scattered throughout a state so that compact districting produces a 
disproportionate share of seats for the opposing party, the Court 
would see no problem unless the districts were drawn "in a manner 
that will consistently degrade the electoral power of the minority 
party."126 The same principles should apply, this argument would 
run, for racial minorities. In this way, compact race-as-a-factor dis-
tricting may be viewed as simply shifting predetermined grids, corre-
sponding to "natural" districts, over existing population distributions. 
If decisionmakers move the grids up or down a bit, or left or right on 
the map, even if they do so based on their awareness of the race of the 
voters, the manipulation is quite different from distorting the "natu-
ral" shape of electoral districts to capture minority communities dis-
persed across the state. 
To describe these analytical bases for the "excessive reliance" 
model is not to defend the implicit descriptive and normative ele-
124. As the dissenting Justices asserted in Shaw. See 113 S. Ct. at 2837-38 (White, J., dis-
senting), 2843 (Stevens, J. and Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 
430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977). 
125. Note the parallel to the factors outlined in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), 
for proving vote dilution in multimember districts: 
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geo-
graphically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. . . . Second, Jhe 
minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive .... Third, the minority 
must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it 
... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. 
478 U.S. at 50-51 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
126. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986). 
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ments. We have real difficulty with the concept of a "naturally" 
shaped district. We are also troubled that the theory condemns "race-
conscious" attempts to craft minority districts from scattered minority 
communities, yet complacently relies upon massive residential dis-
crimination to justify compact majority-minority districts. Indeed, 
there is some evidence that the challenged district in North Carolina 
corresponded in part to the growth of black communities along land 
adjacent to the principal railroad line, and that the district constituted 
the principal urban district in North Carolina. 127 And there is some-
thing inherently unsettling about a constitutional principle that allows 
race to be a key factor in drawing minority-dominated districts so long 
as the result does not advertise the ingredients of the process. Such 
distinctions may respond as much to the aristocratic squeamishness of 
the Court as to sound constitutional principle. We address these and 
additional questions in Part III. Nevertheless, we do believe that we 
have located in the Court's opinion and in its general civil rights juris-
prudence a plausible basis for the "excessive reliance" interpretation of 
Shaw. 
III. CRITIQUE OF THE "EXCESSIVE RELIANCE" APPROACH 
For the Court· to have meaningful constitutional oversight of the 
political process, it must fashion rules that do more than simply re-
solve fact-specific controversies. The Court must also craft a rationale 
for its decisions that is both doctrinally coherent and instructive of 
future conduct. By merely stating a preference for nonbizarrely con-
toured districts and an aversion to excessive reliance on race or ethnic-
ity, Shaw fails on this score unless state actors can put its commands 
into operation. We therefore tum now to an assessment of how well 
Shaw is likely to work at both a practical and a theoretical level. The 
critical inquiries concern what sort of concrete meaning one can give 
to the exhortation not to go "too far" in relying upon race in redis-
tricting, and whether the Court's implicit analytical defense of the 
"too far" theory undermines the legitimacy of both race-conscious 
compact districting and districting in general. 
A. How Will We Know It When We See It? 
A curious misperception pervades this opinion so concerned with 
appearances. The Court declares that a cause of action exists to chal-
127. Interview with Professor Rudolph Wilson, Department of Political Science, Norfolk 
State University (Oct. 30, 1993) (regarding preliminary results of study of black population 
trends in North Carolina). 
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lenge a district "so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can 
be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races. " 128 But of course no 
district, no matter how bizarrely drawn, can be viewed on its face as an 
attempt to separate voters on the basis of race. As Professors Richard 
Pildes and Richard Niemi show in their contribution to this collo-
quium, oddly shaped districts may further all sorts of interests - be 
they defined by geography, interest groups, partisanship, or incum-
bency.129 A district is no more than lines on a map; unless the map 
shows demographic data, there is no basis for inferring anything about 
the racial makeup of the constituency. Thus, to be operational, the 
Shaw standard requires the development of a factual record - a leg-
end for the map - that "interprets" the oddly shaped district. The 
need for further data does not mean that Shaw is for that reason alone 
unworkable or incoherent, just that it is more complex than the Court 
leads us to believe. 130 It also means that, even as the Court edges to-
ward a color-blind understanding of the Constitution, it is unaware of 
its own race-conscious assumption that lines on a map can alone 
demonstrate an intent to segregate voters based on race. 131 While 
North Carolina may have been willing to stipulate the exclusive racial 
purpose behind the creation of the I-85 district, 132 it is unlikely in the 
aftermath of Shaw that district courts will find quite so streamlined a 
factual basis for discerning the excessive reliance on race in a complex 
redistricting plan. 
Second, the success of the Court's opinion in Shaw will depend on 
128. 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (emphasis added). 
129. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 91, at 576-84. 
130. Interestingly, the Court does not explore the possibility of other explanations for the 
irregularly shaped district. An important element of its equal protection jurisprudence is its 
unwillingness to assume that disparate impact evidences bad intent. In situations in which the 
reasonable observer might believe that further evidence is unnecessary - for example, the virtual 
absence of minority contractors in Richmond, Virginia - the Court has entertained the possibil-
ity that some noninvidious reason accounts for the statistical disparity. In Croson, the Court 
made the highly doubtful suggestion that African-American "career choices" account for the 
data. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 503 (1989). See also Justice 
O'Connor's opinion in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 100-02 (1986), regarding causes other 
than race for voting patterns. 
131. Cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96, in which the Court takes notice of the fact that a major-
ity of the city council that adopted Richmond's set-aside program was African American. See 
Aleinikoff, supra note 44, at 1102-07 (discussing this aspect of Croson). 
132. Even here it must be noted that the state may very well have wished not to confess to 
the partisan considerations that may have forced the creation of the I-85 district. The partisan 
desire to protect incumbents in the southeastern portion of the state was certainly a proximate 
cause of the creation of a contrived black district in the north-central region. The Department of 
Justice objected to this aspect of the redistricting in Shaw on the grounds that a majority-minor-
ity district in fact could have been created in the southeastern part of the state. 113 S. Ct. at 
2820; see also 113 S. Ct. at 2832 (suggesting that a better configured black district in the south-
eastern part of the state might be constitutionally acceptable). 
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the ability of lower courts to give operational meaning to the concept 
of an excessive reliance on race in redistricting. Unfortunately, the 
fleshing out of this standard may prove quite difficult - and far more 
difficult than the Court's earlier "some but not too much" incarna-
tions in academic settings or in employment, where there generally 
exists some neutral baseline against which the Court can measure the 
extent to which preferences have been utilized and the extent to which 
those preferences may have disrupted the settled expectations of the 
dispreferred. Courts can gauge academic preferences against stan-
dardized performance indicators, such as tests or grades, that give 
some indication of the extent to which race has been used as a "plus" 
factor. Similarly, in employment prior measures of job performance 
or selection exams can be used to demarcate the extent of the racial 
preference. Under the balancing approach developed in employment 
discrimination cases, therefore, courts can look to such verifiable crite-
ria as labor-market demographics to gauge the extent of exclusion on 
the one hand, and performance indicators or seniority expectations to 
measure the amount of the preference on the other. 133 These measures 
also distinguish, at least in theory, the use of race as "a" factor from 
race as "the" dispositive factor. Consequently, in these contexts it is 
possible to accept race consciousness in the broadly remedial sense, 134 
but to weigh carefully any remedial preference against the costs im-
posed on the dispreferred.13s 
It may prove difficult to rest constitutional doctrine on the extent 
of departures from neutral baselines in the redistricting context. Un-
like employment decisions or academic admissions, redistricting does 
not readily admit a neutral baseline against which "bizarrely" shaped 
districts can be measured. Even within the confines of "one person, 
one vote," the number of redistricting configurations in a large state 
such as California borders on the infinite. If Shaw is to have meaning 
as a working definition of permissible boundaries in redistricting, its 
ambiguous commands must be given some operational content. 
A stricture from the Supreme Court not to do anything in excess 
does little to guide state redistricting authorities in the delicate negoti-
ations that inevitably surround decennial reapportionment. Lower 
courts interpreting Shaw may conclude that the essential problems of 
districting are intractable, and that the Court's reluctance to confront 
these problems is a recognition that no judicially manageable solution 
133. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1987); Wygant v. Jackson 
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986). 
134. See Aleinikoff, supra note 44, at 1077. 
135. See Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 208-14. 
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is likely to be found. If so, then the available alternative is not to cure 
the inherent problems of districting, but rather to constrain the dis-
tricting process to alleviate some of the worst manifestations of the 
manipulation of redistricting to accomplish race-specific goals. We 
tum now to three possible mechanisms, one judicial and two within 
the ambit of the political process, that could bring some order to the 
ambiguity of Shaw. While none is entirely satisfactory, these mecha-
nisms suggest ways to reorder the redistricting process in compliance 
with Shaw, to constrain the "excessive" use of race as a factor. 
1. Objective Standards of Compactness 
One possible resolution of the ambiguities in Shaw is to reify the 
concept of compactness by imposing absolute constraints on the shape 
districts may take. These constraints could either be based on the ac-
tual configuration of the district lines, or on the extent to which geo-
graphically proximate blocks of individuals are fenced out of a 
district. 136 For years, groups such as Common Cause have tried to 
devise compactness formulae to limit the amount of discretion avail-
able to state redistricting authorities. One such formula prohibits re-
districting plans in which the aggregate length of the boundaries of all 
districts exceeds by more than five percent the aggregate length of all 
districts under any alternative plan.137 Such strategies would regiment 
the redistricting process by creating a presumption of unconstitution-
ality whenever there is a significant deviation from maximum 
compactness. 
This solution would resemble the use of legal presumptions that 
has developed under the one-person-one-vote rule following Baker v. 
Carr 138 and Reynolds v. Sanders. 139 It is important to recall that 
the Court in Baker announced the justiciability of claims of unconsti-
tutional malapportionment without indicating what would be the stan-
dard by which such claims would be measured. 140 Two years later in 
136. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 91, at 553-57; Daniel D. Polsby & Robert 0. Popper, 
Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 652, 663 (1993). 
137. Consider, for example, the proposal interposed ,by Common Cause in California that 
"[i]n no case shall the aggregate length of the boundaries of all districts exceed by more than five 
percent the shortest possible aggregate length of all the districts under any other plan . . . . " 
BRUCE ADAMS, TOWARD A SYSTEM OF "FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION" 54 (1977); 
see also Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Proce-
dural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POLY. REV. 301, 339-51 (1991) 
(reviewing mathematical standards for demonstrating departures from compactness 
requirements). 
138. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
139. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
140. 369 U.S. at 237. 
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Reynolds and its companion case, Wesberry v. Sims, 141 the Court an-
nounced the one-person-one-vote benchmark for constitutional claims 
but carefully stopped short of making it an absolute requirement for 
all redistricting. 142 Instead, the Court intended the equipopulation 
rule only to impose an external discipline on state redistricting author-
ities, forcing them to rationalize the reapportionment process. The 
Court's concern was that "[i]ndiscriminate districting ... may be little 
more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering."143 Within 
a short period of time, however, the equipopulation rule created a pre-
sumption of invalidity in any congressional redistricting challenge in 
which population disparities between districts had not been driven 
down to as near zero as practicable.144 
If a standard measure of compactness could be fashioned, and 
if courts could identify straightforward compactness measures that are 
comparable to the one-person-one-vote standard, then Shaw could 
lead to the development of a similar legal presumption. Just as one-
person-one-vote became the simple test to judge the complex equation 
of representational fairness, so too could bizarre districting be defined 
by deviation from a model of compactness. Under such a scenario, 
failure to design compact districts would provide prima facie evidence 
of the impermissibility of a challenged redistricting plan. Shaw would 
then be the Baker of compactness standards, with its own Reynolds 
presumably to follow. 
This scenario is not without its complications. In the first instance, 
it will be quite difficult to define the difference between "compact" and 
unconstitutionally diffuse districts. As Pildes and Niemi show, it is 
not as if there are only two categories of districts: compact and bi-
zarre.145 American districting practices run a full spectrum, and our 
guess is that most lay observers would find "bizarreness" in the shape 
of most congressional districts of the nation. 146 Therefore, the Court's 
141. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
142. The Court instead stated: 
So long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate consid· 
erations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from the 
equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible with respect to the apportion· 
ment of seats in either or both of the two houses of a bicameral state legislature. 
377 U.S. at 579. 
143. 377 U.S. at 578-79. For a fuller discussion of this theme, see Issacharoff, supra note 69, 
at 1647-55. 
144. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730-31 (1983); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 
526, 533 (1969). 
145. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 91, at 540-63. 
146. There would have to be something analogous to what Professor Bernard Grofmnn in a 
different context referred to as the "interocular test." Joint Appendix at JA-129, Thornburg v. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (No. 83-1968) (testimony of Bernard N. Grofmnn in an excerpt from 
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desire to ground the legitimacy of redistricting practices in the appear-
ance of propriety cannot bear fruit. A compactness standard is likely 
to be far too overinclusive to capture only those districts whose odd 
configurations are a product of racial considerations, and not also 
those districts that are the product of considerations that the Court 
has found constitutionally tolerable, including the protection of in-
cumbents147 or the preexisting distribution of power in a state. 148 
The major problem with this solution, however, is that the Court 
in Shaw insisted that it was not seeking to make compactness an in-
dependent constitutional requirement. There is no evidence either in 
Shaw, or in the few other Court examinations of actual districting con-
figurations, 149 that the Court wished to elevate compactness above all 
other districting criteria. •so Moreover, to the extent that the Court's 
underlying concern in the redistricting context remains the elusive 
concept of "political fairness" inherited from Reynolds v. Sims, 151 an 
overriding concern with compactness provides no independent norma-
tive command. We are unaware of any comparable example of pre-
sumptions of unconstitutionality being created exclusively by a 
departure from a norm that has no independent constitutional 
force. 152 
If Shaw's "too far" theory cannot be applied to require compact-
ness, there is a strong risk that Shaw will be nothing more than an 
invitation to ad hoc judicial review of redistricting decisions.153 Ab-
the trial transcript) [hereinafter Joint Appendix]; see also Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Token-
ism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 
1096 n.90 (1991). According to Grofman, statistics indicating polarized voting practices are not 
sufficiently reliable unless they "jump[] up and hit you between the eyes." See Joint Appendix, 
supra, at JA-129. 
147. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740 (citing incumbency protection as a potential reason for a de-
parture from one person, one vote). 
148. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (upholding oddly configured districting 
of Connecticut as a permissible attempt to divide the state between Democrats and Republicans); 
cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144-45 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) 
(positing that state may have a legitimate interest in preserving the stability of the two-party 
system). 
149. See, e.g., Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 735. 
150. Cf. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 398 (W.D.N.C.), ajfd., 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992) (holding 
that compactness is not required in a Bandemer challenge to the same North Carolina districts 
contested in Shaw). 
151. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
152. In fact, Justice O'Connor makes an analogous point in criticizing the creation of a polit-
ical gerrymandering cause of action where the Court tried to avoid identifying the triggering 
mechanism for the new legal claim: "Absent any such [constitutional] norm, the inquiry the 
plurality proposes would be so standardless as to make the adjudication of political gerrymander-
ing claims impossible." Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 157 (1986) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
153. See Karlan, supra note 8, at 1733-37 (describing ad hoc responses to the Voting Rights 
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sent explicit guidance from the Supreme Court on what constitutes an 
impermissible use of race in state districting decisions, each decade 
will inaugurate a new impressionistic course of litigation, presumably 
following the developmental structure of the animal kingdom, over the 
proper shape of districts. Under an uncertain standard, snakelike dis-
tricts would clearly fail, but "bug-splats" might stay on the margin, 154 
and even amoeboid-155 or octopus-shaped districts may survive. There 
is good reason for the Court in Shaw sheepishly to disavow any anal-
ogy to the embarrassing area of failed judicial line drawing in pornog-
raphy cases - the "I know it when I see it" definition of actual, as 
opposed to metaphorical, pomography. 156 Yet, without a clear base-
line definition of what constitutes a "natural" or "compact" district, 
the "too far" theory may be just such a murky and unworkable 
standard. 
2. Administrative Redistricting 
A second solution might come from the state actors against whom 
Shaw has been directed. In this regard, Shaw and its appeal to "tradi-
tional districting principles" might propel states to change the process 
through which they arrive at districting decisions and to redistrict at 
some remove from the immediate demands of the political process. In 
effect, the prospect of liability under Shaw might compel states to 
abandon the most traditional districting practice of all - the use of a 
process that is rife with political compromise. The new redistricting 
process after Shaw could take the form of either independent redis-
tricting commissions157 or the nascent technology of computer-auto-
mated redistricting. 158 In either case, states could capitalize on the 
Court's apparent discomfort in Shaw with the excessive use of race in 
creating the I-85 district. If race or some proxy for ethnically defined 
communities could be one of the factors utilized by a redistricting au-
Act and redistricting); Issacharoff, supra note 69, at 1671 (describing ad hoc quality of adjudica· 
tion under Davis v. Bandemer review of partisan gerrymandering). 
154. For some unexplained reason the Supreme Court in Shaw left untouched the other ma-
jority-black district in North Carolina that had been alternatively described as a "Rorschach ink· 
blot test" and a "bug splattered on a windshield." 113 S. Ct. at 2820. 
155. See Grofman, supra note 7, at 1257 (describing what he sees as a troubling black con-
gressional district in Dallas as an "amoeba"). 
156. 113 S. Ct. at 2827 (alluding to Stewart's concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 
197 (1964)). 
157. Two of the leading political scientists in this area have referred to this as "the sustained 
international trend toward keeping incumbent legislators out of the redistricting process and 
relying more on neutral commissions and stricter formal criteria such as population equality." 
DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 124 (1992). 
158. See Issacharoff, supra note 69, at 1696-702; Michelle H. Browdy, Note, Computer Mod-
els and Post-Bandemer Redistricting. 99 YALE L.J. 1379, 1384-89 (1990). 
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thority, as in states such as Hawaii159 and Montana160 that assign re-
districting to independent bodies, then these independent bodies could 
give preferences to minority representation without running afoul of 
Shaw. It is unlikely that such independent redistricting bodies would 
create a district quite so convoluted as that in North Carolina, but that 
may not be a significant blow to minority representation. Recall that a 
major impetus behind the creation of the I-85 district was the desire to 
protect white incumbents in other parts of the state, an objective that 
would likely diminish in importance if redistricting were to be re-
moved from partisan hands. 
As the amount of litigation over the decennial reapportionment 
process has increased, there has developed a corresponding dis-
enchantment with the cost and delay involved in the process of draw-
ing district lines. A handful of states have abandoned the traditional 
partisan control of redistricting and moved in the direction of adminis-
trative redistricting. It is striking that, of those states that redistricted 
at a remove from the political process in the 1980s round of reappor-
tionment, not one found itself challenged in court over its ultimate 
district lines.161 Most telling perhaps is the example of New Jersey, 
which handled its state legislative redistricting administratively 
through a blue-ribbon commission, and its congressional redistricting 
through a nasty partisan battle in the state legislature. Although the 
legislative redistricting effort went unchallenged, the Supreme Court 
159. Under Hawaii's redistricting statute, permissible congressional redistricting criteria 
include: 
(1) .No district shall be drawn so as to unduly favor a person or political faction. 
(2) Except in the case of districts encompassing more than one island, districts shall be 
contiguous. 
(3) Insofar as practicable, districts shall be compact. 
(4) Where possible, district lines shall follow permanent and easily recognized features 
such as streets, streams, and clear geographical features, and when practicable, shall coin-
cide with census tract boundaries. 
(5) Where practicable, state legislative districts shall be wholly included within congres-
sional districts. 
(6) Where practicable, submergence of an area in a larger district wherein substantially 
different socioeconomic interests predominate shall be avoided. 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 25-2 (1988). 
160. Montana provides for a commission comprised of five citizens, "none of whom may be 
public officials." MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14. 
The majority and minority leaders of each house shall each designate one commissioner .... 
[T]he four commissioners shall select the fifth member .... The commission shall submit its 
plan ... to the legislature ... [which] shall return the plan ... with its recommenda-
tions .... [T]he commission shall file its final plan ... and it shall become law. 
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14. The commission is allowed to review five criteria in reapportioning 
the state: governmental boundaries, geographic boundaries, communities of interest, considera-
tion of existing district boundaries, and an attempt to stay within a five percent, plus or minus, 
deviation from the ideal district population. McBride v. Mahoney, 573 F. Supp. 913, 915 (D. 
Mont. 1983). 
161. See Issacharoff, supra note 69, at 1690, for statistics underlying this claim. 
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ultimately struck down the congressional districts in Karcher v. 
Daggett. 162 
Any solution that depends on established political machines yield-
ing huge sources of partisan power is inherently problematic. None-
theless, both the extent and cost of litigation surrounding redistricting 
has already induced some states to adopt nonpartisan reapportion-
ment. To the extent that Shaw adds one more irresolute element to 
the redistricting wars, the Court's ambiguous commands may lead 
more states in this direction. 163 Even so, the problem remains that 
politicians will be extremely reluctant to turn the redistricting process 
over to experts, or that expert panels may themselves succumb to the 
political influences and racial gerrymandering that inspired the 
Court's ire in Shaw. 164 
3. Nondistricted Elections 
Another possibility is that Shaw could bring renewed attention to 
nondistricted concepts of representation, both as remedial tools in 
voting-rights litigation and as a potentially more substantively fair 
mechanism for running elections. Advocates of nondistricted repre-
sentation begin with the insight that traditional districting necessarily 
constricts the range of permissible electoral alliances based on the ines-
capable criterion of geographic proximity. Nondistricted elections, on 
the other hand, allow individuals to aggregate themselves according to 
interests that are of moment to them, be those interests territorially 
centered or rooted in some ideological stance. This is an advantage of 
the most common form of nondistricted representation: at-large elec-
tions. Such electoral systems, by reducing the role of the geographic 
component of elections, help avoid the bloodletting associated with the 
drawing of subdistrict lines. But the disadvantage of at-large schemes, 
and the cause of their downfall under the Voting Rights Act, is that 
they permit individuals to aggregate on the basis of racial identity. 165 
If so, and if nondistricted elections allow individuals to aggregate on 
162. 462 U.S. 725 (1983); see also Issacharoff, supra note 69, at 1690, for further 
documentation. 
163. This is independent of whether the Constitution commands computer-generated dis-
tricts. See Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 398 (W.D.N.C.) (three-judge court), ajfd., 113 S. Ct. 
30 (1992) ("While requiring the General Assembly to adopt nonpartisan, computer-generated 
districts might be a good idea, it clearly goes beyond what the Constitution mandates."). 
164. Among the problems introduced by expert panels is what Professor Bruce Cain refers to 
as a "bipartisan gerrymander." BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 159·66 
(1984). It is entirely conceivable that attempts to preserve the power bases of incumbents of both 
parties while providing some opportunity for growing minority communities could lead to ex-
tremely oddly configured districts, perhaps even on the order of that which confronted the Court 
in Shaw. 
165. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance 
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whatever basis is important to them, then isn't the problem with 
nondistricted elections that they might permit a replication of the pat-
tern of minority exclusion from elective office that prompted the sec-
ond generation of voting-rights challenges? In other words, if 
individuals can aggregate as they wish in nondistricted elections, can't 
they aggregate in ways that systematically exclude minorities from 
representation? 
This problem may not be intractable, as observers of the Lani 
Guinier episode will realize. There are a number of voting mecha-
nisms that can allow intermediate groups to form alliances and elect 
representatives based on voter self-identification while preventing the 
complete capture of all representation by a strongly motivated major-
ity voting bloc. To understand how these systems might work, con-
sider a five-member city council elected under at-large voting in which 
each voter would be allowed to cast one vote for each of the five posi-
tions to be filled. Because the election would turn into a sequence of 
single elections for each position, the same voting majority could con-
trol the outcome in each election and thereby reproduce its preference 
for each council position. Districting systems cure this problem by 
allowing each voter to elect only one of the five council members by 
restricting each voter's participation to one designated electoral sub-
district. The same goal of preventing a majority monopoly on repre-
sentation can be achieved through the use of modified at-large 
elections, termed semiproportional systems by political scientists. 166 
The two most promising of these systems are limited167 and cumu-
of Racism, 63 COLO. L. REV. 325, 355-64 (1992) (arguing that voting-rights law implicitly con-
demns the continuing discrimination manifest in polarized voting practices). 
166. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in 
Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 223-36 (1989). 
167. Limited voting accomplishes this goal by allowing each voter to vote across the entire 
slate of candidates for office, but to cast fewer votes than there are positions to be filled. Thus, 
voting in this system is "limited" in the sense that each voter is to cast fewer votes than the total 
number of positions to be filled. Each voter is still allowed to pass on each candidate in that 
electoral district. However, each voter, for example, would be permitted to vote for only three 
candidates for five city council positions. The limited voting system therefore preserves the ac-
countability of each candidate to all voters in the district but takes away from a cohesive majority 
voting bloc the ability to have its candidates fill all the contested offices. 
The amount of support necessary for a group of voters to achieve electoral success is ex-
pressed as the threshold of exclusion. If the number of votes each voter may cast is divided by 
the number of votes each voter may cast plus the number of seats to be filled, the threshold can 
be calculated. For example, if each voter could cast three ballots in a five-seat election, the 
threshold of exclusion would be 3/8 or 37.5%. This means that any candidate getting votes from 
37.5% of the voters could not be denied election whatever the configuration of remaining votes. 
This in turn means that any candidate who is the choice of 37.5% of the voters would be elected. 
This contrasts with the current multimember election districts in which the candidates who are 
the choice of 49% of the voters may be defeated if the majority 51 % bloc votes cohesively for a 
slate of candidates. The threshold of exclusion can be raised or lowered by the number of votes 
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lative168 voting. Both of these systems restrict the capacity for major-
ity domination, without the use of electoral divisions, by modifying the 
way in which each voter may cast votes. 
While these systems were once the esoterica of a few academics169 
and a handful of litigants around the country, they came into national 
prominence in the controversies surrounding the failed nomination of 
Professor Lani Guinier as Assistant Attorney General for Civil 
Rights. It is one of the ironies of Shaw that it not only vindicates 
many of the concerns that Guinier expressed, but that it may propel 
many electoral jurisdictions to follow her encouragement of nondis-
tricted voting-rights remedies as a way of avoiding redistricting bat-
tles. Shaw, which was announced only two months after Guinier's 
nomination was withdrawn, may move "the mainstream" in the direc-
tion of the precise course charted by Guinier. Nonetheless, it must be 
recognized that, to the extent that the Court's apparent dedication to 
geographically based districts continues to reflect the norm in Ameri-
can politics,170 it seems unlikely that Shaw will provoke mass depar-
tures from district-based representation in the near future. 
B. "Filler People" and the Voting Rights Act 
The Court in Shaw clearly wished to confine its displeasure to the 
excesses rather than the essence of districting, but it is far from clear 
that the ultimate problem identified in Shaw can be so neatly cabined. 
Once the restorative justice principle of benefiting historically disad-
given to each voter. Limited voting further has the advantage of not requiring redistricting to 
account for population shifts within electoral subdistricts. 
168. The same benefits can be obtained from an alternative modification of at-large elections 
through cumulative voting, a common form of corporate governance. Cumulative voting and 
limited voting share the ability to allow greater minority participation within a nonsingle-mem-
ber district election system. The difference is that in cumulative voting each voter is given a 
number of votes equal to the positions to be filled. Thus, if there were five city council positions 
to be filled, each voter would have five votes. Each voter would then be allowed to bundle his or 
her votes - also described as "plumping" or "bulleting" the votes - by aggregating the votes 
among the candidates in any fashion desired. A voter could cast one vote for each of five candi-
dates, five votes for only one candidate, three for one candidate and two for another, or any other 
division chosen by the voter. 
Cumulative voting shares with limited voting the feature of a mathematically obtainable 
"threshold of exclusion" that would identify the voting patterns necessary for a cohesive minor-
ity to guarantee the selection of at least one of its candidates. Unlike limited voting, however, the 
threshold of exclusion in cumulative voting is at least in part dependent on the level of organiza-
tion of voters to ensure that they maximize their return on their votes. 
169. See Richard L. Engstrom et. al., Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote 
Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New Mexico, S J.L. & POL. 469 (1989); Karlan, supra note 
166; Daniel Ortiz, Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 
92 YALE L.J. 144 (1982); Richard H. Pildes, Gimme Five, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 1, 1993, at 16. 
170. Indeed, one federal judge, when confronted with a proposed plaintiffs' remedial plan 
calling for limited voting, rejected such an approach as "contrary to most general concepts of a 
democratic two-party system." Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327, 337 (S.D. Miss. 1988). 
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vantaged groups is rejected, as was the case in Shaw, the real problem 
of state-assigned districts stands independently. Under any discretion-
ary districting system, state authorities arrogate to themselves the abil-
ity and authority to determine how representation will be allocated, 
and which individuals or groups will be frustrated participants in the 
electoral marketplace. The obvious confrontation arises in the use of 
race in drawing any set of districts, even those that conform to "tradi-
tional districting principles." In order to flesh out this point, it is nec-
essary to retrace how the issue of minority districts came to the fore in 
the redistricting context. 
1. Districting Under the Voting Rights Act 
The Voting Rights Act and the constitutional voting cases of the 
1960s successfully dismantled the "first generation"171 of overt barri-
ers to minority exercise of the franchise. This early struggle targeted 
literacy tests, grandfather clauses, poll taxes, and voter-registration 
barriers that served as the political armor of Jim Crow. As blacks 
began to exercise the franchise, a second layer of barriers emerged in 
the form of electoral systems that frustrated the electoral opportunities 
of minority-supported candidates and led to the "dilution" of minority 
electoral strength. The primary target of the "second generation" 172 
of voting-rights cases was the widespread use of at-large or multimem-
ber election systems. These electoral systems perpetuated the electoral 
exclusion of minorities by allowing an electoral majority to control 
each elected position.173 The remedy was to concentrate minority vot-
ers in geographic subdistricts in which the minority franchise could 
translate into the election of candidates of choice of minority electors. 
The success of this second generation of voting-rights cases in disman-
tling at-large or multimember electoral systems and erecting single-
member systems174 pressured states to take a new approach to district-
ing not only in the legislative setting, but also in smaller units of local 
government, including city councils, county commissions, school 
boards, and even lesser bodies. 
171. See Guinier, supra note 146, at 1093-101, for a discussion of the different generations of 
voting-rights litigation. 
172. Id. 
173. See text accompanying notes 9-10 (describing the reasons for this phenomenon). 
174. See FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT 78-129 (1990) (describing the pattern of 
such litigation in Mississippi). The creation of single-member districts in tum created the condi-
tions for the mushrooming of successful black political participation. Between the passage of the 
Voting Rights Act in 1965 and the 1990 round of redistricting, the number of black elected 
officials had risen from some 500 to over 7000. See Issacharolf, supra note 117, at 1856 n.112 
(citing PARKER, supra, at 1). 
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The impetus to district in a way that promotes minority represen-
tation subsequently immersed the courts and the Department of 
Justice in the delicate task of ensuring minority voters a meaningful 
chance to elect representatives of their choice. On the one hand, if 
minorities are distributed among newly created single-member dis-
tricts, or among congressional or legislative districts, in a more-or-less 
even manner, then a districting system may be drawn to subordinate 
minorities mathematically within each of the electoral districts, effec-
tively denying them the opportunity to elect any representatives of 
choice. If the same patterns of polarized voting that resulted in minor-
ity exclusion from representation in at-large elections persist in dis-
tricted elections, then the shift from at-large to single-member districts 
would yield the same result in terms of the ethnic composition of 
elected representatives. In a city that is forty percent minority, little is 
accomplished by moving from at-large elections to single-member dis-
tricts, each of which is also forty percent minority. Simply dispersing 
minority voters equally among single-member districts replicates the 
effect of at-large elections. 
On the other hand, the overconcentration of minority voters, 
known in the trade as "packing," could also limit the opportunity for 
minority electoral representation. Take, for example, the districting of 
a city that is forty percent black, is relatively segregated, and has a 
five-member city council. The city could create two seventy percent 
black city council districts that would probably elect two black city 
council members, a result that would replicate minority representation 
in the population as a whole. However, if the council districting lines 
were instead drawn to create one district that was one hundred per-
cent black and another that was forty percent black, black voters 
would likely complain that their electoral influence had been dimin-
ished; such a plan would result in only one minority-elected council 
member. Voting-rights law therefore moves between the concepts of 
dilution, which describes the creation of districts in which minority-
backed candidates are not truly viable, and packing, in which the via-
bility of minority candidates is overdetermined. 
2. Filler People 
These principles of districting under voting-rights law ensure that 
for the state to create viable minority districts, even without violating 
the principles of compactness, the state must create two groups of vot-
ers, both "essentialized" and one marginalized, on the basis of their 
race or ethnicity. First, the state must assign black voters to compact, 
majority-black districts on the basis of their race. Second, the state 
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must assign some group of voters to nondiluted, nonpacked districts to 
balance out the numerical mandates of one person, one vote. These 
additional individuals must not be of the relevant demographic group 
(in order to avoid claims of packing); and, in the interest of minority 
representation, they should not be expected to compete in any genuine 
sense for electoral representation in the district to which they are as-
signed lest they undo the preference given to the specified minority 
group. It is the status of this precarious group - the filler people -
that raises extraordinarily troubling problems under current voting-
rights jurisprudence, regardless of the geographic configuration of the 
districts. Indeed, it is in the name of the filler people that the Court 
ultimately reacted in Shaw. 
The recent redistricting of Florida provides a particularly telling, 
though typical, 175 illustration. In the last round of redistricting, 
Florida was faced with the task of creating an additional congressional 
district. Two alternative plans were contemplated: one would have 
created a district that would likely have elected a black to Congress; 
the other would have rearranged the lines to create an additional 
Hispanic seat. Each plan laid the foundation for the enhanced repre-
sentation of one group by using the other as numerical filler. As the 
reapportionment battles in Florida heated up, the never quite amicable 
relations between black and Hispanic political leaders became increas-
ingly frayed. According to one newspaper article, black spokespersons 
claimed a preferential stake in the additional congressional seat on the 
grounds that the Voting Rights Act was truly intended to benefit 
blacks and not Hispanics; as one black state legislator commented, 
"[i]f the basis of an extra minority seat is the Voting Rights Act, then 
we ought to look and see who it was standing on the Edmund Pettus 
Bridge in Selma getting trampled."176 For their part, Hispanics coun-
tered by arguing that they were the more excluded group in terms of 
actual representation, and that black interests were secured by, among 
other things, the depths of black political power in Atlanta. 
While Shaw seeks to sidestep UJO, 177 the Court's critique of redis-
tricting in North Carolina implicitly challenges UJO's toleration of 
175. Similar controversies have brewed at the congressional and state legislative levels in 
Texas, New York City, and a number of other jurisdictions. 
176. Larry Rohter, A Black-Hispanic Struggle Over Florida Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES, May 
30, 1992, at A6 (quoting State Rep. James C. Burke; the reference to Selma concerns the well-
publicized beating of civil rights demonstrators on March 7, 1965, the broadcast of which gar-
nered support for the passage of the Voting Rights Act); see also Brief for Appellee Florida State 
Conference of NAACP Branches, Johnson v. Degrandy, 124 L. Ed. 2d 634 (1993) (Nos. 92-593, 
92-767, and 92-519) (arguing that, when there is a conflict, the Court should err on the side of 
protecting black rights versus those of Hispanics). 
177. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
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the division of the Hasidic community of the Williams burgh section of 
New York in order to create a majority-black district. 178 Shaw only 
governs the fact pattern of UJO to the extent to which the willful ex-
clusion of the Hasidic community from the opportunity for represen-
tation was accompanied by the use of asymmetric or othenvise 
"uncouth" districting patterns. However, Shaw does not clearly artic-
ulate a normative basis for rejecting the Hasidic community's claim of 
exclusion from the opportunity for representation, when that denial 
was accomplished within relatively "couth" electoral districts. 
Thus, to the extent that Shaw turns on the unseemliness of essen-
tialism, the opinion threatens to invalidate any district that creates a 
seat with an intended beneficiary. This is the case regardless of 
whether the district is based on anticipated racial voting patterns, or 
whether it has been carved out to protect the flanks of an incumbent 
politician. Nor does the Court's invocation of traditional districting 
principles provide any reasonable basis for rejecting the explosive 
claims advanced by filler people who have been assigned the role of 
providing numerical chaff to the representational wheat of another 
group. Simply put, why should the claims of the Hasidim in Williams-
burgh tum on the shape of the district that was knowingly created to 
deprive them of an independent opportunity to elect representatives of 
their choice? 
Shaw therefore does not foreclose the resurrection of the plaintiffs' 
principal argument in UJO, which is the assertion that a districting 
plan violates some rights inherent to the "filler" community. Nor 
does Shaw foreclose a second claim rejecting the adequacy of "virtual 
representation."179 In the ethnic context, these arguments are all the 
more volatile because proponents on each side of the debate advance 
their claims in the language of entitlement, with representation por-
trayed as the grant of a right to dispense patronage, rather than an 
assurance of representation and political self-expression. 
The majority in UJO had no problem rejecting the claims of the 
178. The Supreme Court in Shaw, as we developed above, see supra notes 59-62 and accom-
panying text, undermined both rationales by which the Court upheld the willful division of the 
Hasidic community in UJO. 
179. See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the 
Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1589, 1607-13 (1993) (criticizing concept of virtual repre· 
sentation). For a classic defense of not holding representatives accountable to their narrow con· 
stituencies, see Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in ON GOVERNMENT, 
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 157 (B.W. Hill ed., 1976) ("But [a representative's] unbiased opinion, his 
mature judgement, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to 
any set of men living. These he does not drive from your pleasure, - no, nor from the law and 
the Constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply 
answerable."). 
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filler people because the Court assumed that filler people were not sub-
jected to a dilution of their aggregate group strength, and the Court 
found no stigma associated with the state's classification. But this re-
sponse is not available to a Court now dedicated to an individualistic 
explication of the Fourteenth Amendment. Filler people are by their 
very nature electoral fodder, means to others' ends. 180 Shaw rejected 
the argument, advanced by the dissenters, that whites in North 
Carolina were not harmed by the districting plan because they, like 
their counterparts in UJO, are sufficiently represented in the redistrict-
ing plan as a whole. But it is not clear why the same harm is not 
suffered in race-conscious districting regardless of the shape of the dis-
trict. Whenever districts are drawn to create a designated group bene-
ficiary, the nonpreferred group is essentialized or, worse, denied their 
dignitary right to equal treatment and respect by having their welfare 
discounted. 
The Court's apparent response is that there is no reason to assume 
that a representative will not represent all residents of the district. 
That is, once an election is held, "filler people" become "constituents" 
and command the same attention from their representative as other 
members of the district. But this view seems mere wishful thinking, 
particularly in districts drawn to comply with the Voting Rights Act. 
In such cases, polarized voting is a proven fact, and there is little rea-
son to believe that a representative will not pay primary attention to 
the majority group in the district - a group expressly brought to-
gether to elect the representative of its choice. This point can be gen-
eralized beyond voting-rights cases. If we do not think that there are 
predictable consequences from the way we draw district lines, then 
any lines will do. But just the opposite is true. Line drawers invaria-
bly know who stands to gain or lose when pencil meets map, and win-
ners, not surprisingly, use their power to elect representatives 
responsive to their concerns. 
180. This was directly raised by the Shaw appellants in their Supreme Court brief: 
[T]he black neighborhoods along Interstate 85, which have been purposely gathered into 
North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District, are an American version of the black 
townships under South Africa's apartheid system. Moreover, although they are whites, 
Ruth Shaw and Melvin Shimm, the two Appellants registered to vote in that Twelfth 
District, are in a position like that of the black voters in Gomillion; they have been purpose-
fully "fenced" out ofa district (the Second District) where there is a majority of white voters 
and "fenced" in a district with bizarre boundaries drawn for the specific purpose of placing 
in the district enough black voters to assure that a black person will be elected therefrom to 
the House of Representatives. 
Appellants' Brief on the Merits at 31-32, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357). 
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3. Balkanization and Districting 
In Shaw, the Court is eager to identify the "balkanizing" aspect of 
"bizarrely" shaped districts that can be explained only on the basis of 
race. But it fails to confront the fact that districting is inherently bal-
kanizing, particularly districting done under the watchful eye of the 
Voting Rights Act, and that it is balkanizing regardless of the geo-
graphic shape of the districts created. 
The reason is quite straightforward. Unlike other civil rights stat-
utes, the Voting Rights Act is notably passive in its treatment of the 
central operational pattern that it addresses, at least once the first gen-
eration cases removed the issues of complete exclusion from the 
franchise. The Act's strictures are triggered by majority racial bloc 
voting which, given otherwise nondiscriminatory electoral structures, 
defeats the electoral aspirations of the minority community. For rea-
sons having to do with the nature of voting as a fundamental individ-
ual right, the Act does not address the exclusion of minorities from the 
opportunity of representation at the individual level. Even in the af-
termath of a successful voting-rights lawsuit, individual voters are free 
to vote along racial lines. Indeed, they are free to vote explicitly on 
the basis of race. This lack of an "individual" remedy sets the Voting 
Rights Act apart from statutes governing employment or housing dis-
crimination, for example, whose intervention is designed to break 
down patterns of workplace or residential segregation. Those statutes 
are directed at the primary conduct that is to be avoided, the decision 
to discriminate on an individual level. 
By contrast, the Voting Rights Act seeks to alter the consequences 
of racial bloc voting patterns without governing the way individual 
voters cast their ballots; the primary conduct - the racial patterns in 
voting - is unaffected. The individual act of voting along racial lines 
no more threatens equal opportunity in the electoral arena than the 
individual right to vote secures it. Both the wrong and the right are 
collective by their nature, and together these features of the political 
realm have given rise to demands for structural changes. As the Act 
has developed, the structural changes have been brought about pri-
marily through the race-conscious drawing of district lines. 
The Voting Rights Act also protects the right of participation 
based only on one characteristic, race or ethnicity, and only under one 
condition, the lack of substantial integration. Under the test set forth 
in Thornburg v. Gingles, 181 a minority group seeking the protection of 
the Act must establish, as a threshold requirement, that under a sin-
181. 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986). 
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gle-member districting plan the minority group could create a district 
in which it would constitute a majority of the voting-age population. 
This standard protects those minority communities that are residen-
tially segregated, but it does not provide geographically integrated 
communities with any remedy should they repeatedly fail in trying to 
elect a candidate of their choice. This feature of voting-rights litiga-
tion supports the charge that the Act promotes ghettoization182 -
now recast as balkanization by Shaw. 
We, like Lani Guinier, 183 share the Court's concerns about a vot-
ing-rights jurisprudence so strongly committed to the creation of 
"safe" minority seats. The remedy provided by single-member dis-
tricts has some troubling features. As a descriptive matter, the model 
fails to incorporate the features of an increasingly multihued society. 
Blacks are still remarkably segregated into geographically distinct 
communities, but other minorities - especially Hispanics, Asians, and 
non-first-generation immigrants - are less geographically confined.184 
As a result, voting-rights claims seeking to satisfy the first prong of the 
Gingles test - the ability to create a "majority-minority" district -
are increasingly being brought in the name of more than one minority 
group, aggregated to achieve the numerical threshold established by 
Gingles. This leads to two separate problems. First, these aggregated 
claims are subject to the charge that they merely seek statutory protec-
tion for coalition activities and not a remedy for racial exclusion from 
political life. 185 Second, these aggregate "districts" may have distinct 
political lives from the majority community, but this does not neces-
sarily translate into internal political coherence. Blacks and Hispanics 
often have very different political agendas, as is clearly evident in the 
current Florida redistricting battles. These differences may even sur-
face where competing Latino communities are combined, as with the 
creation of a Chicago congressional seat comprised of distinct Mexi-
182. See United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 186 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
183. See Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-
Member Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135 (1993); Guinier, supra note 179, at 1625-32; see 
also de la Garza & DeSipio, supra note 103, at 1515-17 (questioning whether Hispanic safe dis-
tricts decrease levels of political participation and inculcation of civic values in newly naturalized 
citizens). 
184. See Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Trends in the Residential Segregation of 
Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians: 1970-1980, 52 AM. Soc. REV. 802 (1987). 
185. This charge is pressed most vociferously by Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the Fifth 
Circuit. See Campos v. City of Baytown, 849 F.2d 943, 944-46 (5th Cir. 1988) (Higginbotham, 
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane) (opinion of Higginbotham, J.); Katharine I. 
Butler & Richard Murray, Minority Vote Dilution Suits and the Problem of Two Minority Groups: 
Can a "Rainbow Coalition" Claim the Protection of the Voting Rights Act?, 21 PAC. L.J. 619 
(1990). 
636 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:588 
can-American and Puerto Rican communities.186 
At a more fundamental level, the focus on districting may limit the 
transformative aspirations of political integration. One of the goals of 
the entire movement to broaden political participation, of which the 
Voting Rights Act was an indispensable component, was to open the 
halls of elective office to representatives of and from the diverse com-
munities that make up American society. If such integration of elec-
tive office is an independent good, a goal that merits promotion in a 
democratic society, then the narrow focus on geographically isolated 
districts is at the very least problematic. Insofar as a minority com-
munity "integrates" into society, the benefits of the Voting Rights Act 
are withdrawn, regardless of whether political advancement has ac-
companied the first stages of integration.187 
To the extent that districting under the Voting Rights Act is in-
tended to be the path to inclusion of minority interests, it has been 
underinclusive of the full community that needs to be served. Geo-
graphic districting necessarily brings to the fore the problems of the 
filler people on the one hand, and of virtual representation on the 
other. At a fundamental level, the problem is conceptual, and it turns 
on the difficulty of assigning the right to representation to one commu-
nity at the expense of another. The Court in Shaw ultimately re-
sponded to this problem, presented in a particularly crude and visually 
graphic form. In the process of assigning representation, an external 
authority, such as a state redistricting body, is determining how access 
to electoral power will be allocated. To the nonminorities in a desig-
nated minority district, or even to minority voters who are not of the 
group expected to determine representation in any given district - the 
filler people - representation over district-specific issues is delegated 
to representatives over whose selection they will have little control. 
On broader policy matters external to the district, the assumption in 
186. See Constanza Montana, Daley Walks a Tightrope on Remap, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 24, 
1991, (Chicagoland), at 3. 
187. In addition one can raise arguments that to the extent that a core minority area is 
marked by depressed socioeconomic conditions, and to the extent that more educated and techni-
cally skilled members of the minority community may be found outside the core minority area, 
the focus on geographic representation removes a cadre of potentially skilled advocates from the 
minority group's political processes, as geographically defined by Gingles. The importance of 
access to leadership - the group that W.E.B. DuBois termed the talented tenth - should not be 
disregarded as a cost of districting. 1 W.E.B. DuBOIS, THE SEVENTH SON: THE THOUGHT 
AND WRITINGS OF W.E.B. DuBOIS 385 (Julius Lester ed., 1971). As Arthur Schlesinger re-
cently noted, "All government known to history has been government by minorities, and it is in 
the interests of everyone, most especially the poor and powerless, to have the governing minority 
composed of able, intelligent, responsive, and decent persons with a large view of the general 
welfare." Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Radical, in N.Y. REV. BooKs, Feb. 11, 1993, at 6 (review-
ing GEORGE F. KENNAN, AROUND THE CRAGGED HILL: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL PHI· 
LOSOPHY (1993)). 
December 1993] Race and Redistricting 637 
UJO is that the interests of those filler people will be represented by 
elected officials from elsewhere. For minorities who do not live in a 
majority-minority district - for instance, blacks living outside a core 
inner city neighborhood - the presumption is that their distinct racial 
interests will be effectively served by representatives elected from the 
core neighborhood for whom they cannot vote and with whom they 
may share neither socioeconomic status nor political outlook. 
These inherent problems in districting extend beyond the context 
of race. Geographically based districts assume that political identity 
will primarily correlate with geography. However, the focus on geo-
graphic proximity in districting developed in a time when communi-
ties were smaller and transportation was more difficult. The concept 
of "geographical coherence" may be far less relevant in defining pri-
mary communities of interest in today's society. The census demo-
graphic data reveal a highly fluid society in which changes of residence 
are far from unexpected, and in which the growt~ of "exurbs" - de-
fined by proximity to the highway networks - have replaced any pre-
existing sense of geographic coherence. To the extent that political 
communities of interest do not fall within neat geographic contours -
as with, for example, feminist concerns, environmentalism, foreign 
policy preferences - the persistent use of geographically based dis-
tricts reflects arbitrariness and heavy-handedness on the part of gov-
ernment line drawers. · 
Finally, redistricting in the guise of compliance with the Voting 
Rights Act can too easily mask an effort to reward the holders of polit-
ical power - for instance, the protection of incumbents. Political ma-
jorities have always been able to manipulate neighborhood identity in 
order to reap the benefits of political line drawing. Ultimately the fo-
cus on geography in Shaw should be read as more than an elevation of 
territorial integrity for its own sake. Shaw, together with Davis, ex-
presses the Court's concern with the increasingly naked use of govern-
mental power to dispense electoral patronage through the redistricting 
process. 
It should be clear that this note of sympathy we strike with aspects 
of Shaw does not endorse the Court's focus on district shape. It is 
districting itself, not the bizarreness of the line drawing, that creates 
the problems we have identified. It is unlikely that the Court intended 
Shaw as an opening move toward doing away with districting; indeed, 
the opinion reinforces the Court's satisfaction with geographical repre-
sentation, particularly because, under the facts of Shaw, the alternative 
seems to be divisive interest and race representation. Thus the Court 
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purified geographical districting without realizing that its reasons for 
the purification undermine the normative bases of districting. 
In sum, there is nothing quite so destructive to the legitimacy of a 
representative political system as a challenge to the integrity of the 
process by which representatives are chosen. The Court in Shaw at-
tempted to preserve the institutional legitimacy of the representative 
bodies of government by striking down what it considered to be an 
excessive manipulation of traditional districting norms. The Court's 
attempt to repair surgically only "excesses" is problematic for several 
reasons. First, it is not clear that the problems underlying the Court's 
decision can be confined to the excesses, rather than the essence, of 
districting. Second, the problems of essentialism and state manipula-
tion are inherent in the districting process, and it therefore appears 
that the Court was willing to tolerate the inescapable evils of district-
ing until minorities developed sufficient political clout to claim their 
spoils as well. 188 This criticism raises a serious point about the institu-
tional integrity of the Supreme Court itself, especially because Shaw 
struck down part of a congressional districting alignment that pro-
vided for the election of the first two North Carolina African Ameri-
cans to Congress in this century.189 In the absence of any real content 
to the Court's repeated invocation of the "traditional principles of dis-
tricting," we are left with the gnawing impression that the rules of the 
game were changed only when minorities started to figure out how to 
play. 
* * * 
This Part and the preceding one suggest that the essentialism and 
balkanization that bothered the Court in Shaw appear not to be lim-
ited to the "bizarrely" shaped district, particularly when "normal" 
districts are drawn under the gravitational pull of the Voting Rights 
Act. If Shaw is intended to be more than a "cueing case,"190 one 
might expect the Court to expand its insights to take a serious look at 
districting in general. But, as we have suggested in section II.A, this 
seems an unlikely outcome. That districting wastes votes, the Court 
appears to think, is the price we pay for democracy American-style. 
No system is perfect. Majority rule creates losers and winners, 191 and 
188. Contrast the Court's willingness to tolerate the manipulation of district lines to achieve 
a claimed partisan equity between Democrats and Republicans in the redistricting of 
Connecticut. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
189. 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting). 
190. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69. 
191. At moments of uncertainty in voting-rights challenges, the Court readily retreats to the 
limited insight that in each electoral contest there are of necessity winners and losers. See, e.g., 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971). 
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our system has tolerated the routine creation of losers with remarkable 
equanimity. 
If the Court seems to have neglected the implications of its reason-
ing, it may be because it had different game in sight: the Voting 
Rights Act itself. Shaw fairly invites a constitutional reexamination of 
section 2 of the Act. Should any court decide that the broad remedial 
purposes of the Act compel districting akin to North Carolina's, or 
should any state purport to justify its districting as an attempt to avoid 
section 2 liability, the question will be directly put whether such a 
justification is sufficient, under strict scrutiny analysis, to justify the 
overt use of race as the dispositive factor in the districting decision. 192 
Our aim in questioning the coherence of the Court's reasoning is 
not to cast doubt on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. 
To worry about the essentialism and divisiveness of race lines is not to 
condemn their use in appropriate remedial circumstances. The Voting 
Rights Act is an imperfect remedy for an imperfect world. Congress 
- and perhaps here, as on no other issue, our representatives are ex-
perts - recognized the important, frequently ugly, role that race plays 
in our electoral politics. The 1982 amendments to the Act were writ-
ten to condemn voting structures that relegated African Americans 
and other protected groups to perennial loser status. Congress knew 
that the inability of such groups to elect representatives of their choice 
could not be explained in terms of party affiliation or socioeconomic 
status; rather, race has been and continues to be of singular impor-
tance in the casting of votes in American elections. The presence of 
"racial bloc voting" - a prerequisite to liability under the Act -
means that we are not yet living in the Court's preferred world. 193 It 
is our messy, mortal world that calls for the strong and intrusive reme-
dies of the Voting Rights Act. Were Shaw to be read to condemn 
remedial race-conscious districting as constitutionally impermissible 
essentialism, it would take direct aim at core principles of voting-
rights law developed through almost three decades of litigation. 
192. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831 (reserving question that "if§ 2 did require adoption of 
North Carolina's revised plan, § 2 is to that extent unconstitutional"); see also Voinivich v. 
Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1157 (1993) (reserving question of constitutionality of Voting Rights 
Act); Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2376 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (reserving the 
question of the constitutionality of § 2). 
193. This is the persistent though unfortunate message of voting-rights case law: 
The view of American electoral practices that emerges from the voting rights jurisprudence 
is that of a pluralism that has failed to overcome a paralyzing attachment to racially and 
ethnically defined group identities. Case after case supports the conclusion that the electoral 
arena remains charged with group-based battles in which the simple cueing device of race or 
ethnicity serves as the mobilizing force for legions of voters. The integrative hopes of the 
American melting pot fail at the political frontiers of race and ethnicity. 
Issacharoff, supra note 117, at 1872. 
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IV. STILL AT THE CROSSROADS 
To recapitulate, we have argued that Shaw v. Reno offered the 
Court the opportunity to decide whether its recent Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence - typified by Croson - necessitated the 
fundamental reordering of the constitutional law of voting rights. 194 
The Court, however, gave no clear answer. The Justices gave short 
shrift to the "benignness" and "nondilution" theories adopted by the 
majority in UJO; but Shaw does not overturn UJO. While the Court's 
rhetoric is powerful and lasting - castigating the extensive reliance on 
racial characteristics as "political apartheid,"195 "balkanization,"196 
and "inciting racial hostility"197 - the Court was careful to empha-
size that "apartheid" does not automatically result from the use of 
racial classifications. Nor did the Court hold that such classifications 
are a per se evil departing from a constitutional requirement of color 
blindness. In the Court's words, "race consciousness does not lead 
inevitably to impermissible race discrimination."198 Rather, the Court 
condemned only the use of an "extremely irregular" district that is "so 
bizarre on its face" and "irrational" as to be presumptively invalid for 
its disregard of "traditional districting principles such as compactness, 
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions."199 Even in this lim-
ited holding, the Court was careful to stress that it did not enunciate a 
new constitutional principle; rather, it was explicating the facts under-
lying its reasoning: "We emphasize that these criteria are important 
not because they are constitutionally required - they are not - but 
because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that 
a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines. " 200 
This bobbing and wt:aving has bought the Court time. But, as we 
hope our critique of Shaw has shown, it has also bought the Court -
and lower courts and litigators - troubles. While we know that bi-
zarrely shaped districts that can be explained only on the basis of race 
are bad (assuming we have a reasonable definition of "bizarreness" 
and an appropriate factual record from which to conclude that the odd 
shape is attributable to race) we have no clear guidance on a question 
of singular importance. We do not know how to determine the consti-
tutionality of creating "minority" districts that do not have "bizarre" 
194. So urged by the plaintiffs. 808 F. Supp. at 471. 
195. 113 S. Ct. at 2827. 
196. 113 S. Ct. at 2832. 
197. 113 S. Ct. at 2824. 
198. 113 S. Ct. at 2826. 
199. 113 S. Ct. at 2827. 
200. 113 S. Ct. at 2827 (citation omitted). 
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shapes.201 
Let us suppose that the State of Ohio announced that its reappor-
tionment plan, while adopting remarkably compact districts, was 
drawn with the express purpose of ensuring African Americans 
roughly proportionate representation in the state legislature, and that 
other plans yielding fewer minority districts were rejected precisely on 
that ground. Would the Court announce that the explicit use of race 
raised no constitutional issue? Or, to phrase the question another way, 
would geometry serve not only as a sword to condemn the excessive 
reliance on race, but as a shield to protect an otherwise suspect racial 
classification? The Court's final summary in Shaw, closely read, is am-
biguous on just this critical point: 
[W]e conclude that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute 
under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the 
legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be under-
stood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different 
districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient 
justification. 202 
It seems obvious, though, that if the state has announced the race con-
sciousness of its plan, then the plan "rationally cannot be understood 
as anything other than an effort to separate voters" based on race. 203 
Nevertheless, it is unclear how the Court would address this issue. 
If we have correctly identified the reasons why the use of race in the 
creation of "nontraditional" districts is more troubling than race-con-
scious compact districting, perhaps the Court would stick to its guns 
by announcing that UJO still rules in cases of "normal" race-conscious 
districting. 204 Thus, plaintiffs challenging the Ohio plan would have 
to make out an "analytically distinct"205 dilution claim in order to 
allege a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment. But, as we 
have argued in section I.A, all signs are that the Court's more recent 
cases have significantly undermined the "benign" purposes and "dilu-
201. Nor is there much in the Court's prior experience with gerrymandering that provides 
any guidance. In general, the Court has looked at oddly configured jurisdictional lines in the 
past to infer the purpose of the political actors responsible for drawing those lines. For example, 
in the breakthrough case challenging the racial exclusion of blacks from the municipal bounda-
ries of Tuskegee, Alabama, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Court found that the 
city's alteration of its boundaries to create "an uncouth twenty-eight sided figure" to be probative 
of an impermissible effort to exclude black voters, and only black voters, from the municipal 
electorate. 364 U.S. at 347. 
202. 113 S. Ct. at 2828. 
203. 113 S. Ct. at 2828. 
204. The continued vitality of the UJO reasoning is open to doubt. Contrast, for example, 
Justice Rehnquist's willingness to join in upholding nondilutionary race consciousness in UJO, 
430 U.S. at 165-68, with his participation in the Shaw majority, which rejects the nondilution 
arguments put forward in the various dissents. 113 S. Ct. at 2828-29. 
205. 113 S. Ct. at 2830. 
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tion" aspects of UJO. The Fourteenth Amendment does more than 
invalidate state action that invidiously discriminates against a racial 
minority. It is the use of a racial classification denying equal treat-
ment to individuals that triggers the Court's concern.206 It is thus dif-
ficult to imagine that the current Court would hold any case involving 
an express use of race nonjusticiable. 
Indeed, the intuition that any race-based classification will be sub-
ject to challenge is confirmed by the Court's treatment of the question 
of standing to challenge express racial set-asides in another case 
last Term, Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General 
Contractors v. Jacksonville. 201 In Jacksonville, the Court significantly 
eased the traditional standing requirement of "injury-in-fact"208 for 
cases in which state bodies had used an express quota or set-aside to 
fence out, in an unalterable fashion, designated racial or ethnic groups. 
The Court reversed the holding below that an association representing 
white contractors who were precluded from bidding for ten percent of 
municipal contracts lacked standing to sue because of an inability to 
prove which of its members would have obtained the contracts absent 
the minority set-aside. 209 In such circumstances, the Court held, there 
is the potential for an independent dignitary harm caused by the 
state's use of the racial classification.210 The threat of such dignitary 
harm caused by the state's "excessive reliance," as we have phrased it, 
on racial classifications exempts a would-be plaintiff from the normal 
requirement that he or she have a personal stake in the outcome to 
satisfy the Article III case-or-controversy requirement. Thus, the 
Court concluded, 
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for 
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of an-
other group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the bar-
rier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the 
barrier in order to establish standing. The "injury in fact" in an equal 
protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting 
from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the 
benefit.211 
If neither justiciability nor standing will bar potential challenges to 
206. Although, as Shaw makes clear, the Court wishes to stop well short of proclaiming that 
the Constitution requires all governmental decisionmaking to be color-blind. See 113 S. Ct. at 
2824. 
207. 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993). 
208. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975). 
209. 113 S. Ct. at 2301, 2305. 
210. 113 S. Ct. at 2302-03. 
211. 113 S. Ct. at 2303 (emphasis added). 
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the nonbizarre use of race in redistricting, is there any stopping point 
short of the "strict-scrutiny-all-the-way-down" model? If that is the 
result of Shaw, as we have noted above,212 then the Court's opinion 
will have inaugurated a decennial plague of litigation challenging the 
reapportionment plans of states caught between a race-conscious, 
group-based Voting Rights Act and the individualistic, approaching-
color-blindness ideology of Croson. 
One way out of this muddle is to see Shaw not as choosing one of 
the readings we offered above,213 but as combining them. Following 
the "strict-scrutiny-all-the-way-down" interpretation, all race-con-
scious districting would be formally subject to review under the Four-
teenth Amendment. But the risk posed - that every redistricting 
plan in America with any racial consideration would be subject to a 
strict scrutiny that is "strict in theory but fatal in fact" - would be 
mitigated by a judicial standard that, as applied, condemns only "bi-
zarrely" shaped districts. The result would parallel the current situa-
tion with affirmative action in higher education. Formally, every 
college and university plan is subject to strict scrutiny, but very few 
suits are brought because the affirmative action plans have been con-
structed with Justice Powell's race-as-one-factor-only scheme in 
mind.214 
If we are correct in this assessment, then Shaw, rather than 
Crosonizing reapportionment law, will ultimately be understood to 
have Bakked it. But this conclusion needs further defense in light of 
our earlier argument that Croson, representing a hardened version of 
Bakke, now serves as the paradigmatic case for equal protection analy-
sis. That is, why might a Court that has written the unforgiving opin-
ions striking down an affirmative action plan in Croson be led to adopt 
a standard in the voting cases more sympathetic to race-conscious 
districting? 
One response is that, in fact, the tension between Bakke and 
Croson is not at the level of formal doctrine: both condemn quotas, 
and Justice O'Connor, heir to Justice Powell and the chief expositor in 
Croson, has cited favorably Powell's opinion in Bakke. 215 This inter-
pretation, however, just does not seem to square with Croson. It is not 
212. See supra text accompanying notes 70-88. 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 63-127. 
214. This is also in part because the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence required that 
potential plaintiffs prove that they would have been admitted but for the challenged plan. In 
most cases challenging law school affirmative action programs, for example, the plaintiffs' claims 
have been dismissed on standing grounds. 
215. See Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 621, 625 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 285 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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as if the Court has said to the Richmond City Council, "if you had 
only used race as one factor in crafting your program, it would have 
been acceptable." Croson exhibits extreme unfriendliness to race-con-
scious measures, rejecting common-sense readings of the historical and 
social context of the city's action and insisting upon a burdensome 
level of proof of prior discrimination to sustain such programs. 
We think the answer may lie in the subject matter of the race-
conscious programs. Until Shaw, the Court had developed no reverse 
discrimination case law in the voting-rights field comparable to the 
employment discrimination cases of the 1980s. This is how UJO could 
appear to be an equal protection relic by the 1990s. Tacit approval of 
race-conscious efforts to increase minority representation in the polit-
ical sphere serves two important interests that are less evident in the 
employment context. First, it supports systemic legitimacy by permit-
ting the construction of political bodies more broadly representative of 
American society (contrast cultural readings of an all-white board of 
directors of a major corporation versus an all-white state legislature). 
Second, greater inclusivity at the political level permits the Court a 
weakened role in the evaluation of the outputs of the elective 
branches.216 Thus, it is not surprising that the Court has been notice-
ably more charitable to the Voting Rights Act than to other restora-
tive civil rights statutes.217 In sum, we believe that there are good 
grounds for believing that, for all its Croson-sounding rhetoric, the 
harsh tone of Shaw will be muted in subsequent districting cases. The 
Court's focus on a district's shape rather than the state's use of a racial 
classification will make the tum toward Bakke in the voting-rights 
field possible. 
So read, Shaw v. Reno will come to be understood as part of a 
larger ·~urisprudence of compromise" to which the center of the 
Court is turning. This compromise has both substantive and method-
ological components. Substantively, the Court has located its doctrine 
somewhere between "extreme" positions. Thus, in Shaw, the Court 
rejected the reasoning of UJO that no white suffers injury unless 
dilution could be established because this position would mean that no 
white voter could state a viable constitutional claim. It also rejects the 
216. This point is developed at greater length in Issacharoff, supra note 117, at 1862-71. 
Justice O'Connor's explicit reference to John Ely in her opinion in Croson is also worthy of note 
in this regard. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989). 
217. Compare, for example, the Court's expansive treatment of the Voting Rights Act in 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), with, for example, its narrow reading of Title VI of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566 (1984), and Title VII 
of the same Act in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). In addition, note 
Justice O'Connor's separate opinion in Gingles, unwilling to take the hard line of the other dis-
senters. 478 U.S. 30, 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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polar opposite position that the Constitution guarantees a color-blind 
electoral system, and that any use of race states a Fourteenth 
Amendment claim.21s 
Methodologically, the Court's "jurisprudence of compromise" re-
lies upon vague fact and context specific "standards" and "balancing" 
tests, rather than bright-line, categorical "rules."219 Our reading of 
Shaw - that it embodies an "it's-OK-to-use-race-but-not-too-much" 
standard - is an example.220 The "undue burden" test of Justice 
O'Connor in the abortion cases221 and the· balancing called for in 
affirmative action cases such as Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education 222 are other obvious examples. 
To make the compromise work for redistricting cases, the Court 
must supply one additional element. It must identify a "compelling 
state interest" that would justify race-conscious districting under strict 
scrutiny. The Court's race cases - including Croson - have estab-
lished the remedying of past discrimination as one iron-clad compel-
ling interest. Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke suggests another 
possibility - a First Amendment-ish value in maintaining a "diverse" 
student body. How might these compelling interests work in the re-
districting context? 
If we are right that the Court would tolerate the nonexcessive use 
of race, it would follow that the Court would grudgingly approve the 
continued use of race-conscious districting in the face of a proven vio-
lation of the Voting Rights Act or the constitutional provisions guar-
218. Cf. ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992) (charting the adoption 
of a "reasonableness" test, rather than a bright-line test of color blindness, in the Court's race 
cases from Plessy to the affirmative action cases). The move to the center in Shaw also recalls the 
opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 
2791 (1992), which attempts to steer a middle course between the argument that the state has no 
compelling interest in fetal existence until the point of viability and the claim that the Constitu-
tion does not protect a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. 112 S. Ct. at 2804-08; see 
also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). For another manifestation of this in-
betweenjurisprudence in the First Amendment religion context, see Douglas Laycock, A Survey 
of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 443-49 (1986). 
219. Sullivan, supra note 69, at 26-27. Of course, "balancing" constitutes a method of choice 
for the jurisprudence of compromise, and it is no coincidence that the current compromisers are 
heirs to Justice Powell, balancer par excellence. 
220. See also O'Connor's resolute unwillingness to identify a standard in the Court's most 
important voting-rights case. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 100-01 (1986). 
221. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819-21; Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 529-
31 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
222. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). Justice O'Connor, concurring in Wygant, noted: 
Ultimately, the Court is at least in accord in believing that a public employer, consistent 
with the Constitution, may undertake an affirmative action program which is designed to 
further a legitimate remedial purpose and which implements that purpose by means that do 
not impose disproportionate harm on the interests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of 
innocent individuals directly and adversely affected by a plan's racial preference. 
476 U.S. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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anteeing nondiscrimination in voting.223 A more difficult question is 
whether a state could create minority districts to forestall a constitu-
tional or statutory challenge.224 A mere recitation of a remedial pur-
pose will not satisfy the Court;225 a state, we are quite sure, would 
have to make a reasonably strong showing that it would in fact be held 
liable under the Act before the Court would permit the state to adopt 
a preemptive race-conscious districting plan.226 The kind of factual 
predicate necessary to make this showing is far from clear. 227 In the 
employment discrimination context, the Court has not yet fixed on a 
standard for validating voluntary affirmative action plans. Perhaps 
particular attention ought to be paid to Justice O'Connor's formula-
tion of the standard, both because of her pivotal role in the race cases, 
and because of her stated view that "the proper initial inquiry in evalu-
ating the legality of an affirmative action plan by a public employer 
under Title VII is no different from that required by the Equal 
Protection Clause."228 According to O'Connor, an employer must 
have "a firm basis for believing that remedial action was required;"229 
an employer could establish a "firm basis" if it could "point to a statis-
tical disparity sufficient to support a prima facie claim under Title VII 
•••• "230 
It is not obvious what a "prima facie" standard would look like in 
the voting-rights cases. Neither the Constitution nor the Voting 
Rights Act mandates proportional representation for minority groups, 
nor is the Court likely to believe that nonproportionality necessarily 
reflects a defect in the process, or that standing alone it could consti-
tute evidence of discrimination. In a political system dedicated to 
majority rule, underrepresentation of a minority group hardly demon-
223. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
224. Juster Souter asserts in Shaw that "consideration of race to comply with the Voting 
Rights Act (quite apart from the consideration of race to remedy a violation of the Act or the 
Constitution)" would be a "constitutionally permissible use of race in electoral districting." 113 
S. Ct. at 2847 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
225. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989) (citing Wygant, 416 
U.S. at 276). 
226. "[T]he state must have a 'strong basis in evidence for [concluding] that remedial action 
[is] necessary.'" Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 
(quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277)). 
227. The Court expressly leaves the question open in Shaw. 
228. Johnson v:Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 649 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring 
in judgment). It is likely that the constitutional test will do the work here. That is, race· 
conscious districting plans adopted to prevent successful voting-rights challenges will be held to 
constitutional standards. 
229. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 649. 
230. 480 U.S. at 649. 
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strates a flawed or invidious process.231 Exactly what more must be 
offered to justify remedial, race-conscious districting, short of full 
blown proof of a violation, is unclear. A record of racial bloc voting 
- perhaps established by past, but recent, litigation in the state - and 
a history of discrimination ought to go some of the distance. But 
O'Connor's opinion in Shaw, unlike her ruminations on this theme in 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 232 is not sensitive to previously es-
tablished patterns of racially polarized voting,233 to the history of dis-
crimination in North Carolina, (a former de jure jurisdiction), or to 
the absolute exclusion of blacks from the state's congressional 
delegation. 234 
The second compelling state interest - "diversity" - would be 
significantly easier to establish.235 A more diverse legislature or con-
gressional delegation would better represent the various interests of 
the state, as well as improve deliberations in the legislature, by adding 
to the debate a point of view that is frequently ignored by majority 
legislators.236 But this justification faces heavy sledding for its strong 
essentialist undertones. Shaw condemns the idea that elected officials 
represent only members of their own race. In this regard, Shaw echoes 
the vituperative dissents by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy in Metro 
Broadcasting, which attacked as demeaning and stereotyping the "di-
versity" justification that had been offered in support of the F.C.C.'s 
race-conscious licensing rules.231 
Therefore, to make the diversity justification acceptable to the 
Court, it must be recast along two dimensions.238 First, a districting 
231. Any districting system must accept deviations from proportionality to some extent be-
cause there is no basis to believe that the distribution of voter preferences across a large state will 
be evenly replicated at the local level. See Dean Alfange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the Constitu-
tion: Into the Thorns of the Thicket at Last, 1986 SUP. Cr. REV. 175, 223-24. 
232. 480 U.S. 616, 647-57 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that affirmative ac-
tion can be permitted as a remedial device only when there is evidence of past discrimination). 
233. As was proven in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 41 (1986) (finding by district court 
of "severe and persistent racially polarized voting"). 
234. Cf Johnson, 480 U.S. at 621 (noting the complete exclusion of women from skilled craft 
worker positions as a justification for using gender-based preferences). 
235. Note that Powell's formulation allows colleges and universities that either have not dis-
criminated, or do not want to admit that they have, to adopt race-conscious admissions pro-
grams. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-20 (1978). 
236. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 17 VA. 
L. REV. 1413 (1991); cf Karlan, supra note 8 (discussing the need for multiracial coalitions); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1585-89 (1988). 
237. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602-03, 632 (1990) (O'Connor & Ken-
nedy, JJ., dissenting). 
238. Interestingly, Justice O'Connor appears open to the diversity justification of Powell's 
Bakke opinion. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Eel., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986). Similarly, in Metro, 
in the midst of a crushing critique of the FCC's reasoning, O'Connor writes: 
The asserted interest [of the FCC] is in advancing the Nation's different "social, political, 
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plan must not adopt a "rigid quota" to increase black representation. 
Second, the compelling purpose must not be characterized as the as-
surance that a "black voice" will be heard in the legislature. Both 
these elements attach a hardness to race-conscious programs - an 
unnuanced appeal to race essentialism - that the Court is apparently 
quite prepared to reject. 
As to the first issue, as we have argued above,239 Shaw can be read 
as distinguishing between "race-as-a-factor" districting plans and "ex-
cessive reliance" plans. That distinction, however, is not precisely 
congruent with Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke that race may be 
one factor among many considered in the pursuit of diversity. To a 
certain extent, geographic districting is intended to guarantee a crude 
form of diversity in the home base of representatives. But a true anal-
ogy to Bakke would arise if a state were to draw districts with the 
intent of ensuring representation of a wide range of groups, such as 
those based on religion, gender, party affiliation, or urban-rural resi-
dence. Yet this kind of interest-group districting would be virtually 
impossible to accomplish within geographical districts without impos-
ing a system of proportional representation, and it would constitute a 
dramatic shift in the way districting is done. It is unlikely that the 
Court would require this approach to race-conscious districting or 
that legislatures would adopt it on their own. 
Nevertheless, there is another way in which "race-as-a-factor" may 
enter the districting calculus. As with the Harvard admissions plan, 
states may use race as a "plus factor," as one element among many 
that determines the shape districts take. Consistent with Shaw, the 
antiessentialist critique can be reserved for "excessive reliance" dis-
tricting that creates bizarre districts explainable only on the basis of 
race: a bizarre district can be analogized to the "rigid" quota in 
Bakke. Using race as only one factor to be considered in combination 
with traditional districting techniques is a different matter. These 
traditional elements - geography, political boundaries - do not con-
tribute to "diversity" in the same sense, but they protect against an 
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences," yet of all the varied traditions and ideas 
shared among our citizens, the FCC has sought to amplify only those particular views it 
identifies through the classifications most suspect under equal protection doctrine. Even if 
distinct views could be associated with particular ethnic and racial groups, focusing on this 
particular aspect of the Nation's views calls into question the Government's genuine com-
mitment to its asserted interest; see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (opinion of Powell, J,) ("Race-
conscious measures might be employed to further diversity only if race were one of many 
aspects of background sought and considered relevant to achieving a diverse student 
body."). 
497 U.S. at 621 (other citations omitted). 
239. See supra text accompanying notes 91-127. 
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over-reliance on race. They therefore mitigate the dangers identified 
by the Court in Shaw. 
The second issue is reformulation of the diversity justification away 
from essentializing claims about representation of "the minority per-
spective." A more defensible version, we believe, would focus on legit-
imacy rather than voice: a legislature without minority representation 
is less likely to be perceived as legitimate by the polity in general, or by 
the minority groups over whom it exercises power. Indeed, from this 
perspective Justice O'Connor's statement that "appearances do mat-
ter" seems right. The Court has recognized that legitimacy is, in large 
part, a function of appearance, whether the appearance is one of not 
bending to public pressure in the crafting of constitutional doctrine240 
or ensuring that litigants do not exclude members of minority groups 
from juries.241 It is in this way that race-conscious districting, 
achieved without drawing districts that call attention to themselves, 
might appeal to a Supreme Court that is eager to send a message about 
the limits of racial gerrymandering but is also acutely aware of the 
compelling interest states have in ensuring that members of minority 
groups believe they have a stake and a role in the political process.242 
Thus, if the Court is interested in preserving the ability of states to 
create compact, racially identified districts, it has a way to do so that is 
doctrinally coherent. It could hold that race-as-a-factor districting 
furthers a compelling state interest in enhancing the legitimacy of the 
political system without running afoul of Croson 's condemnation of 
"rigid quotas" or the Metro dissents' concerns with essentialism.243 
And what of the filler people? So long as there are electoral dis-
tricts and human line drawers (or computer programmers), there will 
be filler people. It is not enough to say there have always been 
Democrats in safe Republican districts.244 As recent cases show, in 
major urban areas filler people are increasingly members of one minor-
ity group placed in a district made safe for another minority group. 
240. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803-04, 2815-16 (1992) (opin-
ion of O'Connor, J.) (regarding stare decisis). 
241. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2353-54 (1992) (pointing to need for public 
confidence in justice system, which is eroded when group is excluded intentionally through exer-
cise of peremptory challenges). 
242. The claim here is not that the Constitution requires minority representation; it is that a 
state may permissibly pursue diversity in representation in the name of systemic legitimacy. 
243. Under strict scrutiny, this is also an issue of "close fit." This would put pressure on 
states to draw relatively compact districts and provide another reason for distinguishing bizarre 
districts from race-as-a-factor districts, but it could not sensibly produce a requirement for the 
most compact districts - there are simply too many other variables that states may legitimately 
take into account, such as geography and political boundaries, in drawing districts. 
244. See United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167 (1977) (White, J., plurality opinion). 
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There is no easy or ideal answer here. Perhaps the best that can be 
expected or required is that a state seek some fair accommodation of 
the interests of historically excluded groups if it chooses to use race-
based lines in the drawing of districts. 
CONCLUSION 
At the end of the day, Shaw remains an enigmatic decision most 
charitably read for its identification of the inherent difficulties and 
dangers of racially charged politics. Even that reading, however, can-
not hide the tremendous failings of intellectual coherence and practi-
cal application that attach to the ever perilous middle ground of 
compromise. We believe that Justice O'Connor and a majority of the 
Court would ultimately like to push equal protection law toward a 
color-blind standard. In the specific context of redistricting, this 
would translate into race-neutral, compact districting that would be 
indifferent to the racial composition of districts. Shaw presented the 
Court with an opportunity to impose just such a categorical norm on 
the unruly processes of redistricting, but the Court conspicuously re-
fused to adopt this norm. The failure to move in the direction of abso-
lute race neutrality reflects a reasoning that can only be imputed to the 
Court. Shaw is an opinion that rises or falls with the concept of legiti-
macy. The Court is quite clear and outspoken on the manner in which 
excessive reliance on race threatens legitimacy. But the Court's re-
fusal to reject all considerations of race is an acknowledgment that the 
interests of systemic legitimacy demand that important public institu-
tions be integrated in late twentieth century America. 
Under this view, Shaw follows its doctrinal progenitors, most nota-
bly Bakke, in searching for a principle of fair accommodation to the 
needs of a diverse and heterogeneous society. Even assuming the va-
lidity of long-term aspirations toward a constitutional norm of color 
blindness, the fact remains that this society can no longer tolerate an 
absence of minority representation in its elite institutions, be they pro-
fessional academies or legislative halls. Accordingly, race conscious-
ness within the confines of "normal" districting behavior will be held 
to impose no undue burden on individual rights of equal treatment. 
Nevertheless, excessive or unalterable race-based decisionmaking will 
be deemed to inflict dignitary harm on affected individuals and to 
threaten systemic legitimacy because of its inherent divisiveness. 
Oddly, then, Shaw implicitly resurrects the conclusion, though de-
cidedly not the reasoning, of UJO to provide the only intelligible ap-
proximation of a standard to be applied in subsequent redistricting 
challenges: 
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[W]e think it . . . permissible for a State, employing sound districting 
principles such as compactness and population equality, to attempt to pre-
vent racial minorities from being repeatedly outvoted by creating dis-
tricts that will afford fair representation to the members of those racial 
groups who are sufficiently numerous and whose residential patterns af-
ford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in the 
majority.245 
Despite the problems we identify above, geography will· subdue - or 
hide - the evils of race-conscious districting while serving the goal of 
political legitimacy. 
So we are left with an unsatisfactory theory that yields an unsatis-
factory standard for its implementation. Shaw does not adequately 
instruct lower courts as to how they should review subsequent claims, 
it does not resolve the ongoing claims of the filler people, and it does 
not answer the more troubling questions that lie close to the heart of 
any system of districting. It is, in short, Bakke all over again. Perhaps 
the only uncontested conclusion that we can reach is that this murki-
ness seems regularly to result when law meets race. 
245. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2829 (1993) (quoting UJO, 430 U.S. at 168 (alterations 
and emphasis in original; citation omitted)). 
